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Using National Border Climate Adjustment
Schemes to Facilitate Global Greenhouse Gas
Management in Industrial Production
Alexandra Khrebtukova

Abstract
I argue that an appropriately conceived and well-designed border climate
adjustment scheme, as a policy mechanism potentially utilizable by many
States party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
may lead to desirable consequences for the development of comprehensive
global greenhouse gas management in furtherance of the Framework
Convention’s objectives.
By creating the conditions for a healthy
experimentalism and regulatory competition among the regulating bodies of
diverse national markets, the use of origin-neutral border climate adjustment
schemes, equivalent to the climate regulatory costs imposed on like domestic
products as a condition of market access, may lead to a quicker development of
more efficient and ultimately more effective global greenhouse gas
management than is likely to be achieved through ex ante international
consensus. Finally, I contrast my scheme design proposal with recent
important proposals including climate border adjustment provisions in the U.S.
Congress.

J.D. 2008, LL.M. (International Legal Studies) 2009, New York University School of
Law, Institute for International Law and Justice. The author wishes to thank Professors Richard
Stewart, Benedict Kingsbury and Robert Howse, as well as Toni Moyes, Bryce Rudyk, James
Chapman and the anonymous editors of the Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment,
for their help in arriving at the final version of this paper. A much shortened version of some
arguments presented herein appears in CLIMATE FINANCE: REGULATORY AND FUNDING
STRATEGIES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 266 (Richard B. Stewart,
Benedict Kingsbury and Bryce Rudyk, eds., 2009).
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I. Introduction
A growing international consensus surrounding the problem of
anthropogenic climate change1 has led to the imminent rise of ever-expanding
regimes of climate policy—what I will call greenhouse gas (GHG)
management. International negotiations are currently under way in an attempt
to secure consensus within the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Framework
Convention) regarding how best to coordinate international effort to achieve the
Framework Convention’s objective of stabilizing global GHG emissions at
levels sufficient to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
planetary climatic systems2—a goal that recent assessments by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC or Intergovernmental
Panel) suggest would require dramatic reductions from present emissions
levels.3
Despite an ostensibly coordinated top-down international response to the
threat of climate change through the UNFCCC, however, in reality the task of
stabilizing and reducing GHG emissions has manifested itself as an immensely
complex and difficult process, grid-locking high-level political decision-making
and only recently picking up speed in the form of a fragmented
experimentalism at more localized levels.4 Because climate change response
can be extremely complex and involve many competing interests,5 there are
1. The concern is that the emission of certain gases in the course of a number of
fundamental industrialized processes could reach a quantity that would cause the earth’s
atmosphere to trap an increasing amount of heat that would normally be radiated out to space,
causing the overall global temperature to rise, and consequently altering a number of important
eco-systemic processes.
See generally International Panel on Climate Change,
http://www.ipcc.ch/ [hereinafter IPCC].
2. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/2853.php [hereinafter
UNFCCC]. For up to date information on the ongoing negotiations, see UNFCCC Secretariat,
http://unfccc.int/2860.php.
3. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT. CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING
GROUPS I, II AND III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT, available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthes
is_report.htm [hereinafter FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT].
4. See, e.g., David Victor et. al., A Madisonian Approach to Climate Policy, 309
SCIENCE 1820 (2005); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate
Regulation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008).
5. See, e.g., WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE OPTIONS ON
GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES (Yale University Press 2008) (approaching global response to
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great political hurdles to simply establishing a holistic, coherent, and effective
global administrative regime for top-down GHG management. As witnessed by
the difficulties encountered in international negotiations regarding existing
agreements on global climate change—including especially the failure to get all
States to agree to binding limits on their future GHG emissions6—such hurdles
to a top-down administrative design process may prove insurmountable.
Political difficulties may thus significantly hinder the progressive development
of comprehensive global GHG management, and in so doing, may obstruct the
objective of UNFCCC itself—the stabilization of atmospheric GHG levels so
as to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the planetary climatic
system.7
In addition to the mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol to the
UNFCCC8, GHG management campaigns have been undertaken by a
substantial array of governmental and non-governmental actors. From national
emissions regulation policies, to regional or sub-national governmental
initiatives, to voluntary organized self-regulation, these initial instantiations of
what must ultimately be understood as a global abatement effort are beginning
to occur at multiple levels and scope of governance. In this paper I will focus
on just one dimension of this fragmented process of GHG-management regimedevelopment—requirements for GHG emissions accounting (measured in tons
of carbon dioxide equivalent, or tCO2e) and restrictions at the national level.
climate change as a complex and highly interdisciplinary issue).
6. The UNFCCC Parties are categorized within two Annexes: Annex I Parties explicitly
commit themselves to national GHG mitigation policies, whereas non Annex I Parties do not.
See UNFCCC, supra note 2, Art. 4. Importantly, however, some non Annex I Parties are major
GHG emitters. See, e.g., Chris Buckley, China Report Warns of Greenhouse Gas Leap,
Oct.
22,
2008,
available
at
REUTERS,
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSTRE49L0Z920081022 (reporting on a
Chinese Academy of Sciences 2008 report concluding that China, a non Annex I UNFCCC
Party, is likely to contribute GHG emissions to the global atmosphere that “will tower over all
others’ much sooner and higher than an earlier government forecast indicated,” and that
“[r]esearchers abroad estimate China’s carbon dioxide emissions now easily outstrip that of the
United States, long the biggest emitter”).
7. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at Art. 2 (“The ultimate objective of this Convention and any
related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”).
8. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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Further, I will focus on just one aspect of GHG-emissions regulation—the
regulation of GHGs emitted in the course of GHG-intensive industrial
production.9 Specifically, I will argue that the nature of GHG emissions and of
contemporary globalized markets suggest that a State may most effectively and
appropriately regulate its ongoing contribution to GHG emissions from global
production by orienting its internal GHG-regulatory scheme so as to regulate
production at the point at which the final product enters the national market for
consumption. I will then trace the legal implications of this insight as a matter
of international trade law. In utilizing the concept of border climate adjustment
(BCA) schemes, I will mean a general category of national regulations directed
at certain categories of imported products, which seek to impose a price
approximating their production’s cost to the global climate,10 so as to preserve
their competitive relationship with similarly regulated domestic production;
conversely, BCA schemes may also include components directed at similar
categories of exported products, which seek to remove certain domesticallyassessed climate costs, in order to allow such products to be fairly taxed by the
countries of their final destination.
I argue that BCA measures, when adopted in conjunction with domestic
cap and trade legislation in which GHG emission permits are initially allocated
by governmental auction, may be analyzed under the law of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in the same way as border tax adjustments levied on
imports to adjust for what is essentially an internal indirect tax on GHGintensive energy input into like domestic production—a tax paid by domestic
producers to the government in the form of the purchase of emissions permits at
governmental auctions. On this understanding, I argue that provided that such
BCA measures do not, in their design or application, unjustifiably violate a
WTO Member’s legal obligations—such as the most favored nation or the
national treatment provisions—they are in principle permissible as a matter of
WTO law.
To illustrate, I propose some considerations for designing a WTOcompliant and environmentally effective BCA scheme to complement internal
GHG emissions cap and trade programs. In the last section of this paper, I will
contrast this origin-neutral design proposal with three important BCA schemes
9. GHGs emitted in the course of certain energy-intensive industrial production are a
significant source of GHG pollution worldwide. My use of the term ‘GHG-intensive industrial
products’ will generally correspond to the use of the term ‘primary product’ in the U.S. BCA
proposals discussed below. See infra note 128.
10. The imposed cost will, of course, reflect the political constraints on efficient
regulation. Nevertheless, the important point is that such an approximation is the aim in the
regulation of both imports and like domestic products.
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recently proposed to the U.S. Congress, which tend to classify products
according to their country of origin and to involve complicated determinations
regarding whether the country in which a covered product was produced
imposes GHG regulations that are ‘comparable in effect’ to those that would be
imposed under the proposed U.S. acts. I argue that these proposals place the
U.S. legislation into unnecessary tension with U.S. legal obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT or General Agreement).
Some may argue that a successful international agreement within the
UNFCCC COP may obviate the need for, or even prohibit the use of BCA
measures. First, in the event that international consensus is not reached on a
global regulatory scheme sufficiently stringent to ensure the level of emissions
reductions recommended by the Intergovernmental Panel, Parties may wish to
enact more stringent internal regulatory programs in furtherance of the
Framework Convention’s objectives. In that case, stringent regulatory schemes
may not be politically viable without the inclusion of BCA measures (or
without significantly reducing incentives for meaningfully restructuring the
country’s economic infrastructure toward a low-GHG economy). Second, as I
will argue in the Sections that follow, the use of origin-neutral BCA measures
may in any case be desirable as a matter of both economic efficiency and
environmental effectiveness, by allowing for a healthy experimentalism and
policy competition among diverse regulatory jurisdictions.
In sum, I will argue that (1) given the issue’s complexity and the political
difficulties of reaching timely international consensus regarding an
appropriately stringent global GHG management regime, the use of welldesigned BCAs may prove more successful at progressing the bottom-up
development of comprehensive GHG management than an exclusive strategy of
ex ante international negotiations (Section II); (2) BCAs may further prove
advantageous from a number of important perspectives, including by
encouraging greater popular sovereignty or sovereign autonomy, as well as
greater regulatory competition in an uncertain field in need of innovation
(Section III); (3) properly conceived, designed and implemented, BCA schemes
are in principle consistent with a Member’s legal obligations in the WTO
(Section IV); and (4) existing legislative proposals for a BCA to complement
the passage of a U.S. GHG-regulatory regime are designed in a way that
unnecessarily conflicts with U.S. obligations under WTO law (Section V). A
clash between global objectives with respect to climate change, which may
require the use of BCAs to safeguard the individual effectiveness of bottom-up
initiatives, and global trade objectives, which demand that such BCAs be
applied so as to carefully impose as little restriction on trade as possible, may
be unnecessarily detrimental to both sets of important interests.
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II. Continued Relevance of BCA Despite International Negotiations in the
UNFCCC COP
The UNFCCC is universally ratified by all Member States of the United
Nations. There exists accordingly near universal consensus among the peoples
of the world that GHG concentrations in the global atmosphere must be
stabilized “at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system.”11 The IPCC, whose first assessment report served as
a basis for negotiating the UNFCCC,12 recently reported that “[g]lobal
atmospheric concentrations of [GHGs] have increased markedly as a result of
human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values,”13 and
that “[t]here is high agreement and much evidence that with current climate
change mitigation policies and related sustainable development practices,
global GHG emissions will continue to grow over the next few decades.”14 The
IPCC further reports that “[m]ost of the observed increase in global average
temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed
increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations,”15 and that the impacts of a
continued rise in global temperature, ranging across a two to three Celsius
degree change from average temperature over 1980-1999, are likely to include
“[h]undreds of millions of people [being] exposed to increased water stress”;
“[u]p to 30% of species at increasing risk of extinction”; “[w]idespread coral
mortality”; “[m]illions more people ... experienc[ing] coastal flooding each
year”; “increasing burden from malnutrition, diarrhoeal, cardio-respiratory and
infectious diseases”; and “[i]ncreased morbidity and mortality from heat waves,
floods and droughts.”16
Negotiating a comprehensive global regime for effective GHG
management under the UNFCCC has proven a contentious and slow-moving
affair. As is well-known, international recognition of a potential danger from
11. UNFCCC, supra note 2, at Art. 2.
12. World Meteorological Organization & United Nations Environment Programme,
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: 16 Years of Scientific Assessment in Support of
the Climate Convention, Dec. 2004, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/10thanniversary/anniversary-brochure.pdf.
13. IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, § 2.2 Drivers of Climate Change.
14. Id. § 3.1 Emissions Scenarios.
15. Id. § 2.4 Attribution of Climate Change. Anthropogenic GHG emissions impact the
global climate system in many complicated ways. See id. (“[D]iscernible human influences
extend beyond average temperature to other aspects of climate change, including temperature
extremes and wind patterns.”).
16. Id. Figure 3.6: Examples of Impacts Associated with Global Average Temperature
Change.
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excessive GHGs in the planet’s atmosphere began to gain momentum in the
1970s. The Intergovernmental Panel was established in 1988, and the
Framework Convention adopted at the Earth Summit in 1992. At its third
meeting, in 1997, the Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention
adopted the Kyoto Protocol, designed to lower collective GHG emissions in
industrialized countries to about 5% below 1990 levels by 2012.17
Nevertheless, results have been mild. While IPCC findings suggest that
GHG levels in the atmosphere should be reduced by approximately 80%
relative to 1990 levels by 2050 in order to prevent dangerous interference with
the global climate,18 as of 2007 the global concentration of GHGs in the
atmosphere was about 24% higher than in 1990.19 It is likely that even the
relatively modest aim agreed to in Kyoto—a reduction of just 5% of
industrialized countries’ GHG emissions relative to 1990 by 2012—may not be
accomplished, given that the United States, whose territory contributes about
one quarter of global GHG emissions,20 is not a party, and that some states who
are parties have already expressed concerns about their ability to meet their
targets.21
At the thirteenth COP, in December 2007, the UNFCCC Parties agreed on
a plan of action which emphasized “the urgency of confronting climate change
as indicated in the fourth evaluation report of the IPCC.”22 In order to prevent
the projected climatic changes attributable to a two to three Celsius degree rise
in global temperature as a result of continued anthropogenic GHG emissions,
the IPCC reports that overall global GHG emissions should be reduced by 5085% relative to levels in the year 2000.23 However, the UNFCCC contemplates
17. See generally Kyoto Protocol, supra note 8. The protocol came into force in 2005.
See UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
18. See generally IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3.
19. World Meteorological Organization, WMO Greenhouse Gas Bulletin, The State of
Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Using Global Observations through 2007, available at
http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/arep/gaw/ghg/documents/ghg-bulletin-4-final-english.pdf.
20. See United States Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. Greenhouse Gas Inventory
Report, available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/usinventoryreport.html.
21. See, e.g., Environment Canada, A Climate Change Plan for the Purposes of the Kyoto
Protocol Implementation Act – 2007, available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/edes/p_123/CC_Plan_2007_e.pdf (referring to the economic difficulty in meeting deadlines set by
the Kyoto Protocol).
22. UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session, at 3,
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3 (last visited
January 2, 2009).
23. See IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, Table 5.1 Note (a), at 67 (“The
emissions reductions to meet a particular stabilisation level reported in the mitigation studies
assessed here might be underestimated due to missing carbon cycle feedbacks.”).
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that, under the principle of Parties’ “common but differentiated responsibilities
and respective capabilities[,] . . . the developed country Parties should take the
lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”24
Accordingly, the findings of the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report have been
interpreted on the basis of the UNFCCC’s equity principle to require a 25-40%
reduction of developed (Annex I) states’ GHG emissions, relative to 1990
levels, by 2020, and a 80-95% reduction by 2050.25
Agreement regarding the distribution of global GHG abatement effort
necessary to achieve the UNFCCC’s objective in light of such IPCC findings
has thus far been, and may continue to prove to be politically difficult. A
complicating factor is the deep inter-penetration of GHG emissions reduction
effort and fundamental economic drivers such as energy demand.26 According
to a recent written submission to the ongoing negotiating process,27 the U.S. is
committed to reaching international agreement in the UNFCCC COP to the
extent that “the agreement will reflect the important national actions of all
countries with significant emissions profiles to contain their respective
emissions.”28 To that end, the U.S. seeks to require all Parties, including

24. See UNFCCC, supra note 2, at Art. 23(1), (noting that while all Parties should protect
the climate system, developed country Parties should take the lead).
25. See IPCC, “Emission Reduction Trade-offs for Meeting Concentration Targets,” at 2,
Workshop on IPCC AR4 at Bonn Climate Change Talks - UNFCCC SBSTA 28th Session (June
6, 2008) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/presentations/briefing-bonn-2008-06/emissionreduction-trade-offs.pdf (showing a projected 25–40% reduction of developed states’ GHG
emissions by 2020 under Scenario A). See also John Drexhage, International Institute for
Sustainable Development [IISD], “Overview of Outcomes of COP 13 and the Bali Action Plan,”
at 4, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2008/way_forward_drexhage.pdf (March 25, 2008)
(referring to IPCC’s table of emission reductions required to meet temperature scenarios).
26. See IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at § 4.3 Mitigation Options
(“Initial estimates show that returning global energy-related CO2 emissions to 2005 levels by
2030 would require a large shift in the pattern of investment, although the net additional
investment required ranges from negligible to 5 to 10%.”).
27. At the fifteenth COP in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009, the UNFCCC
Parties re-emphasized their commitment to the Framework Convention’s objectives, see
UNFCCC,
Copenhagen
Accord,
at
¶¶
1-2,
available
at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php (last visited January 31, 2010) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord], particularly “with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the
increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius,” id. at ¶ 2, and agreed to continue
negotiations toward an international agreement on allocation of global GHG abatement effort.
See UNFCCC, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative
Action
under
the
Convention,
at
¶¶
1-2,
available
at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/cop_15/items/5257.php (last visited January 31, 2010).
28. UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention (AWG-LCA), U.S. Submission on Copenhagen Agreed Outcome, at 1, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/usa040509.pdf.
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especially developing country Parties (with the exception of the least developed
among them), to submit annual inventories of GHG emissions,29 proposing that
those developing country Parties “whose national circumstances reflect greater
responsibility or capability”30 take on quantified short-term emissions reduction
targets and long-term reduction strategies “consistent with the levels of
ambition needed to contribute to meeting the objective of the Convention.”31
With respect to developing (non-Annex I) countries with “significant
emissions profiles,”32 certain countries in particular uncontroversially spring to
mind. Although China has not reported an inventory of its GHG emissions to
the UNFCCC since 1994,33 studies suggest that China’s GHG emissions
surpassed those of the U.S. around 2006,34 and “are now increasing about 10
times faster than in the United States.”35 Indeed, “[t]o put the size of the
increase in [China’s GHG] emissions in sharp perspective, it is significantly
larger than the decrease in emissions embodied in the Kyoto protocol.”36
In a recent submission to the ongoing negotiations, however, China
emphasized that “[t]he most urgent requirement at present is to set the mid-term
emission reduction target for developed country [Annex I] Parties, rather than a
general long-term global goal,”37 and warned that all Annex I Parties to the
29. Id. at ¶ 5. The Framework Convention already requires annual reporting. UNFCCC,
supra note 2, at Art. 4(1)(a). Many Parties, however, remain in perpetual breach of this
obligation. See generally UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data – Detailed Data By
Party, available at http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do. The Copenhagen Accord agreed to
at the fifteenth COP reiterates the requirement of national inventory reports from non Annex I
Parties. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 27, at ¶ 5.
30. Id. at ¶ 3.
31. Id.
32. See IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3 (referring to developing
countries that would require a significant shift in economic investment to meet GHG emissions
reduction goals).
33. See UNFCCC, Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data – Detailed Data By Party, available
at http://unfccc.int/di/DetailedByParty.do.
34. See Maximilian Auffhammer & Richard T. Carson, Forecasting the Path of China’s
CO2 Emissions Using Province-Level Information, 55 J. ENVT'L ECON & MANAGEMENT 229,
229 (2008) (paraphrasing strong prediction that China’s carbon dioxide emissions will surpass
the United States by 2006).
35. Richard Harris, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Rise in China, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO,
ALL
THINGS
CONSIDERED,
Mar.
14,
2008,
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=88251868 (stating that China’s GHG
emission levels are now increasing about ten times faster than the U.S.).
36. Auffhammer & Carson, supra note 34, at 245.
37. UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the
Convention (AWG-LCA), China’s Submission on Elements to be Included in the Draft
Negotiating
Text
of
LCA,
at
§
1(e),
available
at
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/china240409b.pdf (last visited January 31,
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Convention must commit to at least a 40% reduction relative to 1990 levels by
2020 before meaningful dialogue regarding long-term global commitments may
begin.38 (To put this requirement into perspective, consider that the European
Union, which boasts the world’s most sophisticated and effective GHG permit
market,39 has voiced a commitment to reduce only 30% of its 1990 emissions
levels, provided other Annex I countries make similar commitments, and only
20% if no comparable commitments are made.40) Further, as has already been
noted, China has not reported its GHG inventory to the UNFCCC since 1994,41
a move that some have speculated reflects the country’s persistent fear of, and
continued resistance to, pressures to accept quantified reduction targets.
The point is not to lay blame on any one Party for its negotiating position.
As Gregg Marland, a researcher in the Carbon-Climate Simulation Science
Group at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, rightly points out, “[a] significant
fraction of emissions from China are to produce goods that will be consumed in
the United States,”42 a point I will return to. I seek rather to emphasize the
significant obstacles which still remain in the way of an ex ante international
consensus regarding restrictions on GHG emissions which are sufficiently
stringent to achieve the massive reductions suggested by the IPCC as required
to achieve the UNFCCC’s objective. In this case, the unilateral measures that
large-market UNFCCC Parties like the E.U. or the U.S. will choose to
undertake in furtherance of the Convention’s objective will be of vital
importance to the continued development of an effective inventory of and
regulatory regime for global atmospheric GHG concentrations.
One potentially highly effective way in which Parties have proposed to
regulate GHG emissions is by putting a price on every ton of GHG emitted in
the course of particularly GHG-intensive production, such as iron, steel,
aluminum, pulp and paper, and cement.43 Importantly, however, both industry
and environmental interests have raised concerns regarding the probable
2010).
38. Id.; see also id.§ 2(b).
39. See generally, European Commission, Environment, Climate Change, Emission
Trading
System
(EU
ETS),
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm (last modified July 5, 2009).
40. See European Commission, Environment, Climate Change, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/home_en.htm (last modified February 10, 2009)
(paraphrasing the EU’s intentions to reduce emissions, dependent upon other Annex I countries’
similar commitments).
41. See UNFCCC, supra note 33.
42. Harris, supra note 35.
43. See, e.g., Warner-Lieberman Climate Security Act of 2008, S. 3036, 110TH CONGRESS
at § 6001(10) [hereinafter Warner-Lieberman].
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increase of production in less regulated jurisdictions, and the attendant rise in
GHG emissions, that unilateral domestic regulation is likely to engender in a
world of globalized markets.44 Accordingly, measures to correct for the
competitiveness-distorting/ emissions leakage effects of domestic GHG
regulation may prove a necessary component of such nationwide schemes, both
as a matter of political viability and environmental effectiveness.
A logical way of dealing with leakage is to assess the cost of GHGs
emitted in the course of production at point of market entry—if the final
product seeking market access is required to pay the climate costs of production
at the point of accessing the market in the country of destination (consumption),
irrespective of the regulations in place in the country of origin (production),
then the competitive relationship between products produced in the country in
which they are consumed and those consumed in the same market but produced
in other regulatory jurisdictions will in principle remain unaffected by the
additional costs, if any, imposed upon industry by GHG regulation. Such
market access-conditioning provisions fall within the scope of what I have
followed others in calling border climate adjustment measures (BCAs). Until
recently, BCAs have been the preferred method of approaching the GHG
emissions leakage issue, with both the U.S. and E.U. entertaining proposals for
BCA schemes with respect to certain categories of imported products to
complement the imposition of a price on GHGs emitted in the course of like
domestic production.45
Recently, however, as a result of intense political pressure,46 proposals for
a market access-conditioning approach to combating the leakage concerns of
national GHG regulation have yielded to a preference instead for a scheme
which essentially subsidizes the regulatory compliance costs of internationally
competitive GHG-intensive industrial production. Rather than forcing the
internalization of production’s cost to the global climate into the costs of
production of all GHG-intensive industry seeking access to the regulated
market, the current approach—embodied in, for example, recent draft
legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives47 or the recent European
44. E.U. Commission President José Manuel Barroso has observed that “[t]here would be
no point in pushing EU companies to cut emissions if the only result is that production, and
indeed pollution, shifts to countries with no carbon disciplines at all.” EURACTIV.COM, EU
Warned of Trade War Over Climate Measures, Jan. 28, 2008, available at
http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-warned-trade-war-climate-measures/article-169878.
45. See Warner-Lieberman, S. 3036, §§ 6001 et seq.; E.U. Commission, Draft Directive
amending Directive 2003/87/EC – Future Allowance Import Requirement (FAIR).
46. See, e.g., EURACTIV.COM, supra note 44.
47. See American Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th U.S. Cong. (2009) (as
passed by the House) [hereinafter ACESA (House)]. The ACESA was negotiated on the basis
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Commission proposal for a directive amending the E.U. Emissions Trading
Scheme48—seeks rather to rebate the costs of emissions permits to leakageprone (i.e., internationally-competitive GHG-intensive) industry, or else to
allocate such permits to such industries free of charge.49 Needless to say, the
structure of this approach is evidently contrary to the very object and purpose of
putting a price on GHG emissions in the first place—if globally-competitive
GHG-intensive industrial sectors are effectively exempt from having to pay the
(approximate) costs of their production to the global atmosphere, then they
have little incentive to restructure their cost-benefit analyses in ways that more
nearly approximate optimal social efficiency, and accordingly little incentive to
reorient themselves on a path toward a low-GHG economy.
The arguments in favor of this switch from BCA-enabled approximately
equivalent market access-conditioning requirements for domestic and imported
production to the exemption of competitive energy-intensive industry from the
GHG regulatory burden generally take the form of a fear of protectionism and
challenge in the WTO.50 As I hope this paper will show, a properly designed
BCA not only better safeguards the object and purpose of national GHGintensive production regulation (i.e., the establishment of a price on every ton
of GHG emitted in the course of covered production), but is in principle
entirely compatible with a Member’s legal obligations in the WTO.
Furthermore, as I will argue in the following Section, from the perspective of
environmental effectiveness (i.e., a given regulatory scheme’s ability to effect
meaningful GHG emission reductions), as well as from that of sovereign
autonomy (i.e., a given sovereign’s control over its GHG cost-internalization
strategy), appropriately designed and implemented BCA measures may not only
be a more environmentally attractive option for making national GHG
regulation more politically viable, but may in any case be a more desirable

of an initial discussion draft. See Reps. Henry Waxman & Edward Markey, Discussion Draft,
H.R. 2454, 111th U.S. Cong. at §§ 768 et seq. (May 15, 2009), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20090515/hr2454.pdf. The discussion draft
provides an additional example of a proposal including the possible use of BCA in conjunction
with mandatory GHG restrictions. See infra, Section V.
48. See E.U. Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council Amending Directive 2003/87/EC So As To Improve and Extend the Greenhouse
Gas Emission Allowance Trading System of the Community, at 13–14, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196654.
49. Id. at 14.
50. See, e.g., EURACTIV.COM, supra note 44 (noting that while rebates to competitive
industries may be similarly open to challenge in the WTO as actionable subsidies under the
SCM Agreement, Members are often less likely to bring challenges to subsidies, for fear that
their own subsidies to domestic industry will be left more open to attack).
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alternative to a detailed and rigid ex ante harmonization of international GHG
regulatory policy.
III. BCA Advantages from Environmental, Sovereign Autonomy, and
Economic Efficiency Perspectives
A. Environmental
As previously noted, for large market players like the United States,
joining and implementing an international protocol with binding commitments
to significantly reduce GHG emissions raises concerns that all global GHG
emitters be similarly required to take on binding commitments.51 One concern
in this regard is global competitiveness: at least at present levels of
technological innovation, meaningfully restricting firms’ ability to emit GHGs
has the potential to initially raise their costs of production, hampering their
short-term competitiveness in a global marketplace relative to firms located in
countries that do not impose similar costs on their industry.52
This concern about industry viability translates into a problem of global
GHG management which transcends State borders. Because the nature of
GHG emissions is such that their effect upon global atmospheric GHG
concentrations is irrespective of the location of their emission, loss of
competitiveness of industry within one regulatory jurisdiction threatens, in a
globalized world with significantly liberalized markets, to lead to increased
production within or general relocation to less regulated jurisdictions. This in
turn results in greater total levels of GHG emissions worldwide, accordingly
undermining the environmental objectives of those countries with more
stringent emissions regulatory schemes.
The very same competitiveness concerns that make unilateral GHG
restrictions difficult accordingly have important implications for the actual
effectiveness of any State’s implemented commitment to limit its own
contribution of GHGs to the global atmosphere, for if business relocates from
one territory to another, it not only takes its economic benefits with it, but also
its emissions. The impetus behind a political push for BCA measures to
complement strong regulation of GHGs emitted in the course of domestic
production—such as the European Emissions Trading Scheme, or the kind of
national cap and trade draft proposals now circulating in the U.S. Congress—
accordingly has simultaneously a trade competitiveness concern and an
51.
52.

See generally Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. RES. 98, 105TH Cong. (1997).
See generally id.
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environmental concern behind it. This impetus is known as the problem of
emissions leakage.53
Imagine the following: Rather than negotiating a comprehensive ex ante
distribution of global GHG stabilization effort, the UNFCCC Parties agree to
build up a global GHG management scheme by leaving it up to each Party to
effectively regulate is own contribution to ongoing54 GHG emissions
worldwide. To prevent against emissions leakage – that is, to effectively
regulate some discrete portion of continued global GHG emissions which may
be directly traced back to consumption demands within a given national market
– each party regulates the emissions emitted in the course of producing only
and all those units of (covered) production that enter its market.55
Under existing international law, each Party is free to experiment in the
regulation policies it adopts in furtherance of the object and purpose of the
UNFCCC (or its specific abatement obligations under the Kyoto Protocol).
Further, as I aim to show in the following Section, if a WTO Member chooses
to regulate a portion of worldwide ongoing GHG emissions that is directly
linked to its national market by conditioning access to the market by GHGintensive goods, then it is free to do so, particularly when the scheme does not
offend the two great pillars of the General Agreement—that no trading partner
is favored over another, and that the scheme is not protectionist.
From the perspective of the UNFCCC—that is, achieving stringent and
effective GHG stabilization effort that, inter alia, comprehensively covers the
vast majority of GHGs emitted in the course of certain GHG-intensive
production—the market access-conditioning approach may have an advantage
over an internationally negotiated consensus on a comprehensive global
regulatory architecture. Consider again the negotiating positions of big emitters
and big consumers of GHG-intensive products, such as the U.S. and China. As
these negotiating positions appear difficult to reconcile, many fear agreement
on sufficiently stringent allocation of GHG abatement effort may not be
forthcoming.56

53. See, e.g., ZhongXiang Zhang & Andrea Baranzini, What Do We Know About Carbon
Taxes? An Inquiry Into Their Impacts on Competitiveness and Distribution of Income, 32
ENERGY POL’Y 507, 512–16 (2004) (arguing in the context of a tax analysis that any legislation
that imposes a rise in production costs—whether by tax or by price of tradable allowance—will
have the same effect).
54. This would not include historical emissions. Historical responsibility is not a question
of efficiency and should therefore be dealt with by other mechanisms; for example, side
payments, capacity-building, technology-transfer, etc.
55. See infra Section IV.
56. See supra Section II.

122

1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 107 (2010)

Now consider the possibility that the U.S. adopts a regulatory policy with
respect to GHG emissions that consumption demands within its regulatory
jurisdiction cause to be emitted in the course of GHG-intensive industrial
production, conditioning access to the U.S. market for such products (whether
domestically produced or imported) on surrendering a number of emissions
permits equal to the tCO2e emitted per unit of product entered onto the market,
averaged over total production volume (i.e., a nationwide cap and trade scheme
coupled with the type of BCA that I will argue for in Section IV below). As the
analysis in the next Section will show, were such a scheme to be carefully
designed and applied so as to be neither protectionist nor discriminatory among
trading partners, it would likely withstand challenge in the WTO.
Nevertheless, it is foreseeable that, for example, China, having witnessed
certain of its GHG-intensive exports to the U.S. incur additional climate costs
under the BCA at the U.S. border, may seek to adopt and establish a similar
market access-conditioning policy, so as to similarly impose climate costs on
GHG-intensive products in its home market. Such border adjustment measures
are, again, in principle consistent with China’s obligations under the GATT, so
long as access to the market is conditioned in this way for all products (Chinese
and imported) consumed in China. The result of this likely development, if
China is not to breach its WTO obligations, would therefore be another
UNFCCC Party’s effective regulation of those GHGs that are emitted in the
course of GHG-intensive production as a result of that Party’s contribution to
global consumption demands.
Thus far under the above hypothetical, GHGs emitted in the course of, for
example, steel that is eventually consumed in either the U.S. or China—that is,
a significant percentage of all steel produced in the world57—are effectively
(i.e., not subject to significant emissions leakage) under a GHG costinternalization scheme. As other parties begin to appreciate the benefits of
similar market access conditions,58 the percentage of regulated tCO2e emitted
in the course of GHG-intensive industrial production would accordingly
gradually rise to encompass the greater portion of all such emissions,
culminating in the build-up of an eventual global regulatory scheme covering
an important sector of worldwide GHG emissions.
57. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, Mineral
Commodity
Summaries,
Iron
and
Steel,
Jan.
2009,
available
at
http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/iron_&_steel/mcs-2009-feste.pdf;
WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, Chinese Steel Production and Consumption Increase Sharply, Affect
Economies Globally, May 17, 2005, available at http://www.worldwatch.org/node/114.
58. Not the least of such benefits may be the significant revenue gains of BCA payments
to the government.
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B. Sovereign Autonomy
Further, consider the merits of such a bottom-up approach from the
perspective of popular sovereignty and/or sovereign autonomy. Recall again
that so long as a WTO Member’s market access-conditioning policy does not
discriminate among imports and like domestic products nor among trading
partners (I will show in the next Section what such a BCA could look like), and
so long as the Party’s GHG policies successfully allow it to conform with its
obligations under the UNFCCC and any subsidiary agreements, then the State
remains free to adopt any policy its sovereign (in many Parties’ case, the
people) deems appropriate to achieve its goals. Unlike negotiations toward
international consensus on a detailed global GHG management scheme, where
the delegates who debate the many important issues that arise in this regard are
unelected officials generally far removed from public scrutiny and influence,
and where the resulting outcome is often presented to a restricted portion of
domestic political representatives on an essentially take-it-or-leave-it basis,59
the WTO-consistent BCA approach would encourage greater public
participation and popular sovereignty with respect to the balance of interests
necessarily at the heart of all GHG management policy.
It is true that not all Parties to the UNFCCC are democracies.60
Nevertheless, no matter what kind of constitutional architecture a given State
possesses, it will always be the case that a global GHG management strategy
which leaves it up to each Party to regulate its own contribution to GHG
emissions from global industrial production encourages greater sovereign
autonomy—and hence generally involves the participation and influence of a
greater portion of people in the relevant society—than a strategy seeking to
impose an internationally negotiated consensus on that State’s domestic policy
from the top down.
C. Economic Efficiency
As discussed above, the eventual establishment of a comprehensive global
GHG management regime in furtherance of the object and purpose of the
UNFCCC does not necessitate agreement on an ex ante integrated scheme.
59. There is of course the limited power of amendment through the practice of
reservations, but this technique is hardly equivalent to a thorough public debate and opportunity
to influence the actual structure of regulatory policy.
60. See generally Parties to the Convention and Observer States,
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/items/2352.php (last visited November 8, 2009).
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Using the destination principle with respect to regulating the internalization of
climate costs into the costs of GHG-intensive industrial production—i.e.,
imposing these costs at point of market entry—facilitates the gradual build-up
of an eventually comprehensive global GHG management regime by
encouraging each Party to regulate its consumption demands’ contribution to
causing these emissions, without the fear of emissions leakage or loss of
competitiveness. In addition, because such a gradual build-up would facilitate
the emergence of best practices through regulatory competition, a fragmented
market access-conditioning approach may encourage important efficiency gains
by incentivizing competitive experimentation as the global economy gradually
reorients itself to internalize climate costs into the cost of industrial production.
A paradigmatic leap of modern economics—evidenced by increasingly
common coalitions between arguments from efficiency and arguments from
environmental sustainability, and the rise of environmental economics more
generally61—is that the environmental impact of business enterprise is a
significant cost to society, a deadweight on the national economy, and one that
must be accounted for in the cost-benefit analyses of economic rationality.62
Once costs to systemic integrity (whether of the general social fabric or the
underlying ecosystem) are recognized as negative externalities, it becomes clear
that true economy-wide efficiency—a State’s optimal comparative advantage—
requires that these costs be internalized into economic decision-making—a
recognition that “the path to true productivity [and competitiveness] is one
where the goal is zero pollution and 100-percent efficiency.”63
In fact, researchers have repeatedly confirmed the existence of a positive
correlation between high environmental regulatory standards and economic
profitability.64 This is because internalizing the environmental costs into the
61. See, e.g., NATHANIEL O. KEOHANE & SHEILA M. OLMSTEAD, MARKETS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 2 (Island Press 2007) (arguing that economics provides the appropriate
framework for analyzing environmental issues by properly measuring the cost and benefits of
policy choices and ultimately choosing the policy that nets the greatest benefit to society as a
whole).
62. In the United States, for example, the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321 et seq., ensures that environmental impact is included in federal regulatory cost-benefit
analyses.
63. CURTIS MOORE & ALAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY 45 (Beacon Press 1994).
64. See, e.g., MOORE & MILLER, GREEN GOLD, supra note 63, at 234–35 n.2 (finding a
correlation between profitability and environmental performance and a link between profits and
social responsibility, exemplified by a 16.7% higher profitability in various measures for firms
that were most highly rated in environmental protection, charitable giving, community action,
and advancement of women and minorities); id. at 75 (discussing an emerging body of evidence
supporting a correlation between environmental protection and economic growth, including

USING NATIONAL BORDER CLIMATE ADJUSTMENT

125

cost of production encourages producers to further enhance production
efficiency.65 Accordingly, the more accurately a given regulatory jurisdiction
accounts for and distributes the ecosystemic externalities of production (or,
conversely, of consumption), the more it positions its regulated entities toward
the realization of optimum efficiency and its attendant competitive advantage.66
Hence “‘[t]he nations with the most rigorous requirements often lead in
exports of affected products’ through reengineering of production methods to
produce a better product at less cost.”67
From this perspective, top-down harmonization of regulatory standards
may be unnecessarily stifling.68 On the same public policy principles that
support global market liberalization generally, competition in approaches to
public policy may serve to achieve greater net wealth of (global) public benefit:
“Exploiting differences in government policies is no less legitimate than
exploiting differences in natural endowments.”69
Stephen Meyer's study that found States with stronger environmental policies consistently outperformed on all economic measures when compared to those states with weaker policies).
65. See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 261 (Harvard University Press, 1995) (“Political jurisdictions which have
developed stricter product standards force foreign producers in nations with weaker domestic
standards either to design products that meet those standards or sacrifice export markets. This,
in turn, encourages those producers to make the investments required to produce these new
products as efficiently as possible.”).
66. See MOORE & MILLER, supra note 63, at 44 (stating that experience “demonstrates that
technology, innovation, and government policy can overcome resource and regulatory
constraints”).
67. See id. at 44 (quoting Michael Porter, America’s Green Strategy, SCI. AM. 168
(1991)).
68. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Liberalization & Regulatory
Diversity: Reconciling Competitive Markets with Competitive Politics, 6 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 9
(2005) (“[Albert] Breton argues that while the European Union is quite stable, this stability has
been acquired by the virtual suppression of intercountry competition through excessive policy
harmonization. While the principle of subsidiarity seems intended to address these concerns, it
has often proven difficult to give it clear operational content.”) (citing ALBERT BRETON,
COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS 275 (Cambridge University Press 1996) (additional citation
omitted); id. at 13–14 (“[T]o deny to countries of origin the political ability to set their own
environmental policies, in the absence of technological externalities, is to flatly contradict the
view of governments, persuasively developed by Breton, as competitive organizations which in
the process of competing within and amongst each other enhance the accuracy of demand
revelation for public goods and policies.”). Trebilcock and Howse argue that “[p]rovided that
countries respect the principle of non-discrimination by avoiding the adoption of policies or
practices that violate the National Treatment Principle understood as guaranteeing effective
equality of competitive opportunities (not outcomes) and do not engage in disguised or
unjustifiable forms of discrimination, they should have broad latitude to determine their own
(but not other countries’) domestic policies.” Id. at 28.
69. Id. at 14.

126

1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 107 (2010)

The concept of ‘regulatory competition’ generally refers to a situation in
which two or more regulatory schemes ‘compete’ with each other for revenue
or other benefit associated with hosting business enterprises within their
respective jurisdictions. The idea is sometimes dramatized by the trope of a
‘race to the bottom’ or ‘competition in laxity,’ whereby it is theorized that the
lack of an effective mechanism for top-down harmonization of minimum
standards, combined with the relative ease of exit and relocation increasingly
afforded by a progressively more globalized world, is likely to lead to long-term
lessening of minimum standards across the board.70 In fact, however,
heterogeneous regulatory schemes have at least just as often led to a ‘race to the
top’ or ‘competition in stringency.’71 This has been particularly the case where
the regulatory schemes in question have taken the form of market access
restrictions, such as the proposed BCA under consideration here.72
Furthermore, as Moore and Miller poignantly show, environmental
regulatory competition among different regulatory jurisdictions can also affect
long-term competitiveness on an economy-wide scale.73 To illustrate, Moore
and Miller analyze the dramatic shift in competitive relations between the
United States, Japan, and Germany that occurred during the 1980s.74 They
report that in 1988, at the time that concerns over rising levels of GHG
concentrations in the global atmosphere had lead to the establishment of the
IPCC, the U.S. was poised “to establish itself as the unrivaled industrial power
of the twenty-first century.”75 Instead, it was surpassed by Japan and
Germany.76 Moore and Miller argue that this was in significant part because
Japan and Germany’s stringent environmental regulations, by incentivizing
economic rationality to take cost to society (in the form of environmental
externalities) into account, provided demand for increasingly more efficient
technology.77 In the U.S., powerful sectors prevented the adoption of more

70. See, e.g., DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUCTURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION:
CORPORATIONS AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 6–8 (Oxford University Press 2004)
(discussing 'race to the bottom' and 'competition in laxity').
71. See, e.g., id. at 7–8 (discussing 'race to the top' and 'competition in stringency').
72. See id. at 8–14 (suggesting that open economies will tend toward more stringent
market access restrictions).
73. See generally MOORE & MILLER, GREEN GOLD, supra note 63 (stating that true
economy-wide efficiency requires costs to be internalized with regard to economic decisionmaking).
74. See generally id.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 11–14.
77. See id. at 4 (“Germany and Japan, as well as virtually all the rest of America’s primary
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stringent regulatory standards to force the internalization of these
externalities.78 As a result, the U.S. regulatory structure failed to incentivize
the readjustment in U.S. industrial infrastructure that would have allowed for
an advantageous trading position in a world of finite oil resources and
increasing consumer demand for efficiency and environmental sustainability.79
Consider again my proposal for a national BCA conceived on the basis of
the destination principle, as discussed above. Assume that State A adopts a
GHG regulatory policy that places a cap on the total quantity of GHGs allowed
to be emitted in the course of production for domestic consumption within a
given compliance period—say, three years. Assume—on the basis of a costbenefit analysis which incorporates inter-related considerations including the
average cost and/or revenue of the program to State A per compliance period;
the average net costs and/or profits to State A’s industries that flow as a result
of the regulatory scheme; the scheme’s effectiveness at achieving significant
reductions in the GHG emissions of domestic production; as well as the
scheme’s resultant incentive structures for encouraging domestic innovation in
efficiency-enhancement and technological development geared toward longterm global demand—that the net benefit of State A’s regulatory program is
X.80

industrial competitors, have adopted a wide range of policies designed to coax or compel the
development and commercialization of technologies, practices, and industries that do their jobs
as well or better…while producing less pollution.”); id. at 21 (stating that Japan's motivations
for environmental advancements have been strictly commercial and intended to serve sensitive
export markets in order to compete in the world market); id. at 23 (“Germany has shown how
environmental protection through regulation enhances product development, how technological
innovation produces domestic jobs and international competitiveness, and how competitiveness
in turn enhances the domestic economy and creates jobs.”).
78. See id. at 79–81 (listing various factors explaining how and why U.S. corporations
have so relentlessly and successfully opposed policies such as those adopted by Japan and
Germany).
79. See id. at 102–03 (explaining how powerful industry lobbying to a few sectors’
advantage—such as U.S. coal, oil, and gas enterprises—may lead to a situation where “policy
constitute[s] a huge drain on [the State’s] capital, impeding investments toward a more
competitive industrial infrastructure”).
80. Note that the Waxman-Markey draft would require the President, “in consultation
with the [EPA] and other appropriate agencies,” to, no later than June 30, 2017, submit to
Congress a report on, inter alia, “the level of greenhouse gas regulation (including
requirements, export tariffs, or other measures adopted to imposed to [sic] reduce greenhouse
gas emissions) of particular sectors or subsectors in other developed or developing countries,
and the cost of compliance with those regulations, taking into account the distribution of
allowances, credits, or rebates.” Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft, H.R. 2454, § 414(a)(3).
This kind of monitoring of other Parties’ climate policy would allow for the conditions for
fruitful regulatory competition of the sort described in this section.
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Now assume that State B adopts a different GHG regulatory policy within
its jurisdiction—for example, a straightforward tax (not through sale of tradable
allowances) on every tCO2e emitted in the course of production for domestic
consumption,81 such that, on a cost-benefit analysis involving similar factors to
those used for State A above, the net benefit of State B’s regulatory program is
(X + 1), whether because it is more cost-effective per tCO2e-reduction, because
it positions State B’s industrial infrastructure into more favorable trade
relationships given changing global demand, or by some other measure likely to
be recognizable by State agents as beneficial to the long-term prosperity and
competitiveness of their State. Given this situation, States C and D may be
expected to either adopt the existing policy with the greatest net benefits—that
of State B—improve upon State A’s policy so as to raise its net benefits to at
least (X + 2), or experiment with another alternative policy in an effort to gain
still greater net benefits. In all cases, the result is a gradual progression toward
the adoption of more and more efficient and effective regulatory approaches.
IV. BCA Is in Principle Compatible with Members’ Obligations in the WTO
Having argued for the continued relevance of BCA measures despite
ongoing attempts to reach international consensus on a global GHG
management regime, I will present in this Section a model BCA design that is
both suitable to bestow the kinds of BCA advantages argued for above and
does not run afoul of WTO Members’ legal obligations. Importantly, unlike
the kinds of BCA schemes that have been proposed to the U.S. legislature to
date, which I will discuss in Section V below, the BCA scheme argued for here
would not be designed so as to rest its WTO-compatibility on the GATT’s
General Exceptions regime under GATT Article XX. Rather than designing a
scheme that concedes at the outset a prima facie violations of the GATT,
making the restrictive exceptions regime under Article XX dispositive, the
BCA scheme that I will argue for in this Section would be designed so as not to
violate the GATT in the first place, thus obviating the need for justification
analysis.

81. As the scope of this article is limited to the regulation of GHGs emitted in the course
of production, see supra Section I, I continue to restrict the analysis to a comparison of
regulatory policies whose scope is limited in this way. Nevertheless, the conclusions of this
section may apply to arguments in favor of regulatory competition in GHG management more
broadly defined. See Geert van Calster, Against Harmonization—Regulatory Competition in
Climate Change Law, 1 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 89 (2008) (arguing for more climate policy
competition).
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The ultimate purpose of BCA is the preemption of emissions leakage. By
effectively reorienting the point of climate cost internalization in GHGintensive production from the point of production to the point of market entry, a
BCA scheme (used in conjunction with a similar cost internalization scheme
imposed on domestic producers supplying the national market) ensures that the
emissions within its scope of regulation are not offset by the continued presence
of non-regulated products in the marketplace. If GHG tons emitted in the
course of industrial production were regulated by a national cap and trade
scheme coupled with a BCA for imports and exports—that is, if the point of
climate cost payment occurs at point of market entry—the problem of emissions
leakage does not arise. Because production climate costs are equalized with
those of domestic production through fiscal adjustment measures at the border
of importing countries, producers face the same costs regardless of the level of
GHG regulation in the country of origin.
The structure of the threat of emissions leakage suggests therefore that in
an increasingly more globalized world, a UNFCCC Party’s contribution to
global anthropogenic GHG emissions may be more meaningfully measured not
solely by the emissions that natural and juridical persons produce within its
territory, but rather by the amount of GHG emissions that consumption by
persons within its territory cause to be produced in the world. Reorienting the
appropriate scope of a Party’s regulatory power over GHG-intensive production
to focus on domestic consumption (of both foreign and home-made GHGintensive products) is thus in this way essentially a redescription of the
environmental integrity objectives behind safeguarding against the threat of
emissions leakage.
Consider then that rather than designing BCA measures purely to
safeguard the competitive relationship between regulated domestic producers
and unregulated foreign producers, BCA designs may be more fruitfully
conceived as part of a holistic scheme for regulating domestic GHG
consumption82—a straightforward application of the destination principle (the
82. The fact that BCAs serve both to retain competitiveness and to preempt emissions
leakage is neither surprising nor undesirable. In fact, the coalition between environmentalists
and big market players—sometimes metaphorically referred to as the union of Baptists and
bootleggers—is characteristic of many defining leaps in large-scale environmental management.
Particularly in the context of global GHG emission levels, the environmentalist concern from
emissions leakage and the industry concern from loss of competitiveness due to the added cost
of a forced private internalization of costs to a pure public good are mirrored sides of the same
argument: irrespective of the motivations and principles employed by environmental as
opposed to domestic industry lobbyists, both seek to ensure that imported products are also
subject to the forced internalization of production’s cost to the global climate. Nevertheless,
whether the object and purpose of a BCA is conceived in terms of the need to protect the
competitive relationship of domestic industry vis-à-vis its foreign competitors, or rather as a
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principled understanding that certain costs should be levied at the point of
consumption rather than point of origin) for GHGs effectively embodied in
GHG-intensive products through having been caused to be emitted in the
course of their production.
A. Proposal for BCA Scheme Design
Assume, for example, a cap-and-trade program requiring regulated
industries to obtain and retire GHG emissions allowances for each tCO2e
released in the course of a given production period, subject to a nationwide cap
on the absolute number of allowances available with respect to the same period,
consistent with a number of existing schemes and national proposals. A BCA
scheme then seeks to ensure that domestic consumption demands do not
inappropriately distort the competitive relationship between domestic and
imported covered products in a way that undermines a State’s GHG
stabilization effort through the threat of emissions leakage. Under my proposal,
products that are ‘like’83 products whose production is regulated under the
national cap-and-trade legislation would be required to undertake costs
essentially equivalent to those imposed on domestic products by the cap-andtrade scheme upon entry into the U.S. market at the U.S. border.
In contradistinction to the kind of country-based BCA proposed in the
U.S. legislative drafts discussed in Section V below, my proposal would
establish an origin-neutral measure conditioning market-access on the purchase
and surrender of GHG allowances equivalent to the (approximate) total tCO2e
emitted in the course of producing the quantity of product seeking entry into the
U.S. market. This market-access condition would apply entirely irrespective of
country of origin—whether the products seeking access to the U.S. market were
matter of the realities of the developmental phases of comprehensive, effective and efficient
global atmospheric GHG management, may have profound implications for the impact that such
BCAs may have on international trade relations and the global environment.
83. The phrase consistently used in recent U.S. legislative drafts is “closely related to a
good of the United States that is affected by a requirement of [the U.S. GHG cap enforcement
statute].” Lieberman-Warner, H.R. 2454, § 6001(5)(C) (2008); Waxman & Markey Discussion
Draft, H.R. 2454, § 411(1)(C); Reps. Rick Boucher & John Dingell, Discussion Draft, H.R.
2454, 111th U.S. Cong. § 781(7)(C) (Oct. 7, 2008). The ACESA (House) refers to “eligible
industrial sectors,” ACESA (House), supra note 47, § 767(c), which are to be designated by
EPA rule (to be promulgated by June 30, 2011) on the basis of energy or GHG intensity. Id. at
§ 763(b). I will use the term ‘like’ for consistency with the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) by which I will mean both ‘like’ and ‘directly competitive or substitutable’
products. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
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produced in the U.S. or any foreign country,84 all covered products are
essentially taxed with respect to the (approximate) input of GHG-emitting
energy into their production. Note that this requirement is not the same as
conditioning market-access on production process-based restrictions, under
which “[f]oreign producers can use whatever processes they want, and use them
with impunity[;] [t]he only thing they cannot do is bring products produced
with certain processes into the country.”85 To the contrary, the proposed BCA
would not condition market access on any particular production process, but
would simply tax the GHG-emitting energy inputted during production.
My proposal is that the requirement that producers of certain covered
goods be made to surrender at the end of a given compliance period a quantity
of GHG emission permits equivalent to the tons of GHG emitted in the course
of production during the same period should be conceived, for purposes of a
Member’s legal obligations in the WTO, as a tax on the production input of
GHG-intensive energy, per unit of production seeking entry to the U.S. market.
On this understanding, the general legal mechanism that I have called a BCA
scheme may fit within existing structures of international trade law as a
legitimate border tax adjustment measure, a regulatory tool recognized by trade
law for some time.86

84. Subject to the usual exceptions regarding LDCs and countries determined to be
responsible for less than 0.5% of global GHG emissions. All four U.S. drafts that will be
considered below, see infra Section V, exclude countries of origin that have been designated by
the United Nations as least developed countries, as well as those whose total annual GHG
emissions are determined not to exceed 0.5% of total GHG emissions worldwide, from being
subject to the BCA. See Lieberman-Warner, H.R. 2454, §§ 6006(b)(2)(A)(ii), 6006(b)(2)(B);
Boucher & Dingell Discussion Draft, supra note 83, §§ 786(b)(2)(A)(iii), 786(b)(2)(B);
Waxman & Markey Discussion Draft, supra note 47, § 416(a)(C); ACESA (House), supra note
47, §§ 768(a)(1)(E)(ii)–(iii).
85. Robert Howse & Donald Regan, The Product/Process Distinction—An Illusory Basis
for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 249, 274 (2000).
86. See generally Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under
GATT and EC Law and General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5
(1994).
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B. Consistency with WTO Member Obligations

1. The Forced Internalization of Climate Costs Through Payments to the
Government Is a Tax, Whether Accomplished Through Direct Taxation or a
Cap and Trade Program with Auctioned Allowances
The global atmosphere is a pure public good—regardless of anyone’s
individual contribution to global GHG pollution or abatement effort, the
resulting atmospheric GHG concentrations are nevertheless more or less the
same for everyone. Because the atmosphere is not divisible into private
portions that each individual could live within and pollute or conserve as one
wishes—that is, because the atmosphere is a non-excludable resource—no
matter what my individualized GHG pollution or abatement effort, I end up
with exactly the same concentrations in ‘my’ atmosphere you do in ‘yours.’
Because the costs of any GHG pollution are dispersed among everyone in the
world, they do not enter my cost-benefit equation when I decide whether to
engage in GHG emissions-intensive activity. The problem of excessive GHG
concentrations in the global atmosphere—representing significant accrued costs
distributed throughout various sectors of global society87—occurs because the
incremental costs of large scale private GHG emissions (such as industrial
production) will almost never register in individualized cost-benefit equations,
while continuing to accrue to global society as a whole. Public climate policy
through GHG management seeks therefore to respond to this situation by
ensuring that such incremental climate costs are internalized in the economic
decisionmaking of significant GHG emitters by imposing a price on every
tCO2e emitted.
While CO2e cap and trade programs may be preferable for the relative
certainty they permit with respect to actual emissions abatement effort, such
considerations should not obfuscate the fact that a cap and trade scheme is still
structured so as to impose a price—essentially a tax—on every tCO2e emitted
in the course of certain GHG-intensive production. In fact, in a world of
complete certainty, a tax on every ton of GHG emitted or a cap on the total
amount of GHG emissions allowed and a market in which individual GHG ton
permits may be traded would internalize the social costs of GHG emissions into

87. See, e.g., United Kingdom, Stern Report Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, Summary of Conclusions, at vii (“Using the results from formal economic models, the
Review estimates that if we don’t act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be
equivalent to losing at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of
risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of GDP or
more.”) available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sternreview_index.htm.
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individualized costs of production in exactly the same way.88 The difference is
that with a tax, price certainty is privileged over certainty with respect to total
GHG emissions. The price is certain because it equals the tax. Emissions
reductions are uncertain because the costs of abatement may be uncertain, and
hence it is uncertain how many entities would choose to pay the tax rather than
face higher abatement costs. In the case of a GHG emissions cap-and-trade
scheme, on the other hand, the situation is reversed—the emissions reductions
are (relatively89) certain because they are those set by the cap, while the price of
each ton of GHG emitted becomes uncertain as unexpectedly high costs of
abatement may increase demand for, and hence the value of, existing
allowances.
Given the uncertainty of GHG abatement costs as we await helpful
technological innovation, the use of a tax is preferable when certainty about
actual GHG abatement is not immediately necessary, such as when marginal
damages from climate change (and hence the marginal benefits from its
abatement) are linear—the fixed price (which may be periodically adjusted to
approach efficiency, where the marginal cost and benefit of GHG emission are
equated) allows for the internalization of GHG emission costs to society at rates
that do not overburden the economy, hence providing for optimal social
welfare.
On the other hand, despite the same uncertainty with respect to abatement
costs, a GHG emissions cap may nevertheless be preferable when certainty
about achieving particular abatement levels is important, such as when
marginal damages from climate change are not linear, as when certain levels of
GHG concentrations in the global atmosphere may trigger catastrophic global
damages.90 A number of climate change experts have predicted the existence
of certain ‘tipping points’ in the process of climate change—where damage
from climate change, rather than following a linear progression, occurs
irreversibly and at an increasing rate.91 One of the better understood of these
88. Martin L. Weitzman, Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUDIES 477 (1974). See
also KEOHANE & OLMSTEAD, supra note 61 (providing an overview of relevant economic
theories).
89. I say ‘relatively’ certain because certainty depends above all on the feasibility and
actuality of compliance, and because most existing cap-and-trade proposals include some sort of
cost-containment mechanism in the event that a cap appears too stringent in the face of extreme
costs of abatement, such as an allowance reserve or a ‘safety valve.’ See, e.g., Henry D. Jacoby
& A. Denny Ellerman, The Safety Valve and Climate Policy, 32 ENERGY POL’Y 481 (2004).
90. See generally Nathaniel O. Keohane, Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated: Using Tradable
Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gases, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. POL’Y 63 (2009); Weitzman,
supra note 88.
91. See, e.g., Timothy M. Lenton et al., Tipping Elements in the Earth’s Climate System,
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predictions is that of an irreversible meltdown of the Greenland Ice Sheet once
global temperature reaches a certain level, causing global sea level to rise by as
much as several meters. Other such potential points include the collapse of the
Atlantic thermohaline circulation, which carries heat from the tropics to
Northern Europe; a significant decrease in Indian summer monsoon
precipitation, which is responsible for irrigating food for millions of people;
and decreased precipitation in the Amazon and Boreal forests, significantly
deteriorating these crucial ecosystems and global carbon sinks.92
Accordingly, a cap-and-trade (quantity) approach may be preferable to a
direct tax (price) approach with respect to the internalization of climate costs
from GHGs emitted in the course of production, even while the essential
purpose of both mechanisms remains the same—the imposition of a price upon
every tCO2e emitted in the course of GHG-intensive industrial production. For
present purposes—that is, the proposal and analysis of a BCA scheme design
sufficient to permit a State’s effective regulation of GHGs emitted in
furtherance of its consumption demands—the legal architecture and specific
mechanisms that a particular legislature chooses to achieve this general policy
are irrelevant. All that is required in this respect for purposes of the present
analysis is that the regulatory policy seeks to impose a price on GHGs emitted
by some covered sector(s) of the economy. My argument in this Section is that
the imposition of such price, by whatever means (whether through direct tax or
cap and trade, or some other alternative) is equivalent, as a matter of WTO law,
to a tax on the emission of these GHG tons.
2. BCA as BTA
Because the regulatory purpose of a well-designed BCA, coupled with a
national cap-and-trade scheme which initially allocates tCO2e permits by
government auction, is essentially the same as that behind a direct tax levied at
point of market entry for GHGs emitted in the course of certain products’
production, such BCA may, in principle, be structurally conceived as a
105 PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 1786 (2008); Lisa Moore, 9 Dangerous “Tipping Elements”
(February 13, 2008 blog post), http://blogs.edf.org/climate411/2008/02/13/tipping_elements/;
Alok Jha, Scientists Warn On Climate Tipping Points, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 16, 2007, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/16/climatechange.greenland.
92. See Lenton, supra note 91; Moore, supra note 91; Jha, supra note 91. Note that not
all tipping points are predicted to lead to catastrophic damages—with “large uncertainty,” it is
predicted that precipitation in the West African Monsoon could increase, leading to greening,
where “the societal impact could be very positive—a rare potential benefit of climate change.”
Moore, supra note 91.
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legitimate and legal border tax adjustment (BTA) scheme. In 1968, the GATT
Contracting Parties established a Working Party to analyze and clarify existing
international trade law on BTAs, whose report was subsequently adopted in
December 1970 (BTA WP).93 The BTA WP adopted the OECD definition of
taxes: “compulsory, unrequited payments to general government. They are
unrequited in the sense that benefits provided by government to taxpayers are
not normally in proportion to their payments.”94
The forced internalization of climate costs into costs of production through
mandatory requirements to purchase and retire a number of GHG emission
allowances or credits equal to the tons of GHG emitted in the course of a given
compliance period easily fits within this broad definition: subtracting the value
of GHG allowances distributed to domestic industry at no cost, rather than by
governmental auction or through private transactions, the market price of GHG
allowances or credits—which is in significant part a function of the stringency
of a mandatory cap on total GHG emissions—paid to the government at
governmental auctions, in addition to any penalties paid for every ton of GHG
emitted in excess of surrendered allowances or credits, are payments to the
government.
Are these compulsory payments to the government unrequited, or do they
confer a benefit provided by the government in proportion to the price paid?
One could argue that a governmental program imposing a price on every tCO2e
emitted does not require unrequited payment as in return for payment, the
regulated entity receives the right to pollute a quantity of GHG tons precisely in
proportion to that paid for. Nevertheless, it is clear that as a matter of public
policy, GHG emission allowances should not be conceived as benefits in
proportion to the payments made to the government in terms of their market
price, as it would be inconsistent with the object and purpose and the general
spirit of national GHG-capping legislation to construe such an Act as creating
beneficial rights to pollute when its long term goals are in fact to drastically
reduce or eliminate GHG emissions.95
Accordingly, a border scheme that seeks to ensure that imported product
prices reflect an internalization of climate costs into their costs of production,
93. WTO Committee on Trade and Environment, Note by the Secretariat: Taxes and
Charges for Environmental Purposes—Border Tax Adjustment, WT/CTE/W/47, 2 May 1997, at
6 (citing BISD 18S/97) [hereinafter WTO CTE, BTA].
94. Id.
95. See also Matthieu Wemaëre, Legal Nature of Kyoto Units, in THE KYOTO PROTOCOL
AND BEYOND: LEGAL AND POLICY CHALLENGES OF CLIMATE CHANGE 71, 73 (Wybe Th. Douma et
al. eds., Cambridge University Press, 2007) (noting that “the Kyoto Protocol does not create any
rights to emissions or the atmosphere, but it only creates the right for some Parties to a limited
pollution for a defined timeframe”).
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similar to that enforced upon competitive domestic products may in fact be
characterized as a border tax adjustment scheme, under the broad definition of
taxes used by the BTA WP, for purposes of WTO law.96
The BTA WP adopted the following definition of BTA:
[A]ny fiscal measures which put into effect, in whole or in part, the
destination principle (i.e. which enable exported products to be relieved of
some or all of the tax charged in the exporting country in respect of similar
domestic products sold to consumers on the home market and which enable
imported products sold to consumers to be charged with some or all of the
tax charged in the importing country in respect of similar domestic
97
products).

Under the destination principle, goods are taxed at the point of
consumption.98 As argued for above, regulating GHGs emitted in the course of
certain GHG-intensive industrial production at the point of market entry for
final consumption obviates the emissions leakage problem by eliminating the
conditions which lead to it. In a domestic GHG management scheme which
regulates industrial production on the destination principle, the presence of
products not subject to regulatory climate costs is not tolerated. Accordingly,
96. Note that the Panel’s analysis in United States—Measures Affecting the Importation,
Internal Sale and Use of Tobacco, Report of the Panel, adopted by the Council Oct. 4, 1994,
DS44/R, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dispute/gatt/94tobaco.asp [hereinafter US—
Tobacco], regarding which charges should be analyzed as taxes under GATT Art. III:2, and
which as regulations under Art. III:4, supports this conclusion. In US—Tobacco, the penalty
provisions that the Panel denied could be analyzed as a tax were emphasized to have lacked any
purpose without the underlying regulations that they were meant to enforce. Distinct from that
situation, the charge at issue here—the payment of a price for GHG emission—is not subsidiary
to any other regulation. Its primary purpose is precisely to obtain payment from certain covered
entities.
97. WTO CTE, BTA, supra note 93, at 6.
98. Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 86, at 6 (“According to the destination principle,
goods should be taxed only in the country of consumption. In theory, adjustments made
pursuant to the destination principle mean that, while each country is able to implement its own
domestic taxation regime, products from all countries are able to compete in international trade
on the same competitive terms, neither suffering from double taxation, nor deriving an
advantage from a more favourable domestic tax regime in their country of origin.”).
For historical context on the destination principle, see id. at 6 n.6 (“In the degree then
in which [domestic] taxes raise the price of corn, a duty should be imposed on its importation ...
and a drawback of the same amount should be allowed on the exportation of corn. By means of
this duty and this drawback, the trade would be placed on the same footing as if it had never
been taxed . . . .”) (quoting WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO, Vol. IV
(Cambridge University Press) (citing also ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES WEALTH OF NATIONS, Book Four, Ch. IV (Everyman’s Library 1991); TAX
HARMONIZATION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: POLICY ISSUES AND ANALYSIS (George Kopits
ed., IMF 1992); JOHN JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (MIT 1989)) (additional citation omitted).
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competition is not distorted in favor of unregulated products, unregulated
production and its added GHG emissions do not increase as a result, and those
GHG tons upon whom the State has chosen to impose a price—those caused to
be emitted by its domestic consumption demands—are not offset, and hence are
effectively regulated.
The BTA WP further concluded that:
[T]here was convergence of views to the effect that taxes directly levied on
products were eligible for tax adjustment. Examples of such taxes
comprised specific excise duties, sales taxes and cascade taxes and the tax
on value added . . . . Furthermore, the Working Party concluded that there
was convergence of views to the effect that certain taxes that were not
directly levied on products were not eligible for tax adjustment. Examples
of such taxes comprised social security charges whether on employers or
99
employees and payroll taxes.

Accordingly, the adopted BTA WP report emphasized a “convergence of
views” that indirect taxes—those levied directly on the product—are eligible
for border adjustment, whereas direct taxes—those levied on the producer—are
not.100 However, the BTA WP also reported that, despite convergence of views
on the eligibility for border adjustment of most types of taxes—generally falling
along this direct/indirect distinction—a divergence of views had nevertheless
persisted with respect to the adjustability of other types of taxes, notably
including “taxes occultes,” where “[t]axes on ... energy” were “among the more
important taxes” in this category of at the time still uncertain adjustability
status.101
Importantly, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM) included in the Uruguay Round Final Act, which binds all WTO
Member States, explicitly allows the remission of prior-stage cumulative
indirect taxes on inputs “physically incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in
the production process and catalysts which are consumed in the course of their
use to obtain the exported product.”102 A State’s domestic GHG management
99. WTO CTE, BTA, supra note 93, at 7.
100. See Demaret & Stewardson, BTA under GATT and EC, supra note 86, at 7 (“In broad
terms, one can say that, under both GATT and EC rules, taxes on products (indirect taxes) are
eligible for adjustment in accordance with the destination principle, whereas taxes on the
producer (direct taxes) are not, in accordance with the origin principle.”).
101. Id. at 20 (quoting GATT Working Party Report, Border tax adjustments, ¶ 9, L/3464
(Dec. 2 1970)) (emphasis added).
102. World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter SCM Agreement]. See also id., Annex II n.61 (allowing remission of prior-stage
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regime, which mandates the payment of some price for every tCO2e emitted in
the course of GHG-intensive regulated entities’ production effort over a given
timeframe, is essentially a scheme which imposes a tax upon GHG-intensive
energy used in the course of certain industrial production: the majority of GHG
tons emitted in the course of GHG-intensive production is due to the energy
consumed in producing, rather than some other aspect of the production
process.103 Accordingly, were a WTO Member to choose to regulate such
GHG emissions on the destination principle—that is, to impose a price upon
only those GHG tons attributable to products consumed on the home market—
then, under the SCM Agreement, that Member could lawfully remit payment
for such quantity of tCO2e that is proportionate to the portion of total regulated
production effort that is exported to be consumed (and presumably regulated) in
other markets. Provided that such remission does not exceed the value of the
payment initially made, it should not be considered an actionable subsidy under
the SCM Agreement. Rather, it should be analyzed under the law of the WTO
as part of a legitimate border adjustment scheme for charges that the Member
government has chosen to levy at the point of domestic consumption.
The same legal principles that govern the adjustability of consumption
taxes with respect to products destined for export also govern the adjustability
for those same payments with respect to foreign products entering the home
market for consumption. Because, as reported by the BTA WP, “GATT
provisions on tax adjustment appl[y] the principle of destination identically to
imports and exports,”104 eligibility for adjustment with respect to the remission
of taxes on exports destined for consumption in other markets ipso facto
translates into eligibility for adjustment in the form of taxes levied on imports
seeking access to the U.S. market. As Demaret and Stewardson point out, in
addition to the conclusions adopted in the BTA WP’s report, there are strong
arguments for applying the principles of tax adjustment eligibility identically in
respect of both exports and imports:
cumulative indirect taxes on inputs “that are consumed in the production of the exported
product (making normal allowances for waste)”); Demaret & Stewardson, BTA under GATT and
EC, supra note 86, at 29 n.102. (“Guidelines on Consumption of Inputs in the Production
Process, then provides that: ‘Inputs consumed in the production process are inputs physically
incorporated, energy, fuels and oil used in the production process and catalysts which are
consumed in the course of their use to obtain the exported product.’ It is not stated how the
amount to be remitted for each particular product is to be calculated.”).
103. See Ernst Worrell et al., Industrial Energy Efficiency and Climate Change Mitigation,
2 ENERGY EFFICIENCY 109 (2009) (discussing the potential contribution of industrial energyefficiency technologies and policies to reduce energy use and greenhouse gas emissions to
2030).
104. Demaret & Stewardson, BTA under GATT and EC, supra note 86, at 30–31 (quoting
GATT Working Party Report, Border tax adjustments, ¶ 10, L/3464 (Dec. 2 1970)).
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[T]here is a strong policy argument for considering the rules to be the same
in both contexts. If the rules were to differ, then anomalies could arise in
the international trading system. Imported products might either end up
being a double tax burden, or remain free of the taxes in question, and
hence be advantaged as against domestic products, depending on whether
the tax adjustment rules for imports are more or less liberal than those
applying to exports. One may also make an argument based on the
structure of the GATT provisions to the effect that Articles III:1 and III:2
are designed to complement Articles VI:4 and SVI and Note Ad Article
XVI so as to minimize the risk of double or no taxation.105

Tax adjustability criteria under WTO law is and should therefore be
applied identically with respect to adjustments made upon exported and
imported products alike. Accordingly, prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on
GHG-intensive energy used in the course of production are equally adjustable
with respect to imported products seeking access to a Member’s market as they
are with respect to products destined for consumption elsewhere. In any case,
no textual basis in GATT Article III exists to prohibit such analysis. Provided
that the BCA does not otherwise violate a Member’s obligations (discussed
further below), a BCA of the sort that I have here described may, in principle,
be justified as a legitimate BTA scheme under WTO law.106 As already
mentioned, it is important to note that such a BCA does not rest its claim to
WTO legality on the narrow grounds for justification under GATT Article XX.
As a GATT Panel noted in US—Tobacco, the imposition of a cost upon
domestic producers selling on the home market may be subject to border
adjustment if the scheme comports with the requirements of GATT Article III,
paragraph 2.107 GATT Article III generally requires that a WTO Member’s
charges, laws, regulations, and requirements affecting the internal sale of
products must not be applied in a protectionist manner.108 The treaty further
105. Id. at 30–31; see also id. at 20 (noting that to “introduce[] a major discrepancy
between permissible border tax adjustments on imports and exports, respectively, . . . would
have contradicted the economic rationale of ensuring the equality of competitive conditions for
goods in international trade, which underlies border tax adjustments”) (citing GATT Working
Party Report, Border tax adjustments, ¶ 9, L/3464 (Dec. 2 1970)).
106. See Javier de Cendra, Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax
Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis WTO Law, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L.
131 (2006) (examining the legal ramifications of introducing a Border Tax Adjustment to
emissions trading proposals and considering how to reconcile conflicts that may arise).
107. US—Tobacco, supra note 96.
108. See GATT, supra note 83, art. III:1. See also Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 93,
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001), [hereinafter EC—Asbestos] (noting that the “paragraphs of
[GATT] Article III constitute specific expressions of the overarching, ‘general principle,’ set
forth in Article III:1 of the GATT 1994”) (citing Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures
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specifies that taxes or charges of any kind levied on imports “in excess of those
applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products” automatically fall
within the scope of the prohibition,109 as does according treatment to imports
“less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect
of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale . . . .”110
Assessing the amount of required adjustment in the amount of GHG
emissions per unit of production seeking entry to the market (i.e., the amount
and/or price of GHG permits required to be purchased by importers of covered
products) may be done in the same way as the assessment is made for domestic
producers seeking access to the market: dividing the total tCO2e emitted during
the most recent compliance period by total production volume entered onto the
market during the same period provides the number of taxable GHGs per unit
of production seeking access to the domestic market for final consumption. If
all relevant data in this regard is reliably available, then the assessment is
exactly equivalent as to importer and domestic producer. The importer is
assessed costs in the amount of GHGs attributable to every unit of production
entered into the domestic market for consumption, just the same as a domestic
producer, and any bond requirements would accordingly reflect this.
If the importer lacks sufficiently adequate and reliable information,
imposing a best available technology (BAT) standard requirement on how the
emissions “embodied” in imported products are to be calculated would serve to
protect against allegations that the BCA scheme treats imported products “less
favorably” than—or that it imposes a charge “in excess of” that levied upon—
like domestic products, in violation of GATT Article III. That is, assuming best
available emissions-minimizing technology in the production process, the
incoming products would be assessed the costs that would be imposed upon
like domestic products “embodying” the same number of emissions (in a cap
and trade program, the average cost of an emission allowance within the
Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, ¶153, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 20, 1999)); see also id. at
¶ 98 (explaining that “the ‘general principle’ in [GATT] Article III seeks to prevent Members
from applying internal taxes and regulations in a manner which affects the competitive
relationship, in the marketplace, between the domestic and imported products involved, so as to
afford protection to domestic production”) (internal emphasis and quotation omitted); see also
Appellate Body Report, Japan—Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996), at 14–15
(“The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application
of internal tax and regulatory measures. . . . Toward this end, Article III obliges Members of the
WTO to provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products.”).
109. GATT, supra note 83, art. III:2, sentence 1.
110. Id., art. III:4. See also EC-Asbestos, supra note 108, ¶ 100 (“If there is ‘less
favourable treatment’ of the group of ‘like’ imported products, there is, conversely, ‘protection’
of the group of ‘like’ domestic products.”).
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relevant sector, multiplied by the number of allowances required to cover the
amount of emissions, minus the cost of the allowances that would have been
allotted to the domestic producer at no cost).
To the extent that no relevant internationally-agreed standards are
available, the BCA-imposing state may employ objective best available
technology standards developed by domestic agencies or expert institutions on
the basis of transparent and objective evidence regarding the state of industry
technology. It will be important, however, to also include a provision
necessitating an appreciable market share for any existing technology to alter
the best available technology standard in order to avoid a perverse incentive
against innovation for fear of lowering the standard and hence helping one’s
competitors.111
As imports would be given the benefit of assuming the least possible
amount of emissions embodied in the product, and would hence likely not be
prejudiced as against the domestic producers, using the BAT standard would
help to obviate claims that the BCA is violative of the National Treatment
principle embodied in GATT Article III. Further, the BAT standard would also
preempt a challenge on the basis of the Most Favored Nation principle in
GATT Article I, because all countries of origin would either be assessed
identically with the domestic producers (given reliably accurate data), or would
be assessed on the basis of a best available technology standard for each sector.
Finally, using a BAT standard would encourage domestic producers in
competition with imports subject to assessment under this standard to seek out
these best available technologies to ensure competitive production costs, thus
accelerating research and development and technological de-coupling of growth
from GHG emissions-intensity.
Some may argue that applying the BAT standard to imported products in
this way provides an inappropriate set of incentives to high-emitting foreign
producers—that, being assured the BAT standard in any case, little incentive
exists for such producers to actually use best available technology to reduce
emissions, and that the costs imposed upon such producers by the BCA
mechanism upon market entry will not, therefore, accurately represent the
actual climate costs imposed by such production. Consider, however, that to
the extent that there exist domestic producers who do not already use the best
available technology, competition with imported products on the basis of the
BAT standard will encourage these producers to employ emission-abating
111. See R. Ismer & K. Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustments: A Feasible Way to Address
Nonparticipation in Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. L. & ECON. 137 (2007) (arguing that WTOcompatible Border Tax Adjustments for costs incurred from procuring CO2 emission
allowances are a feasible means of effectively reducing leakage).
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technology which a significant portion of the market already employs, thereby
proportionately lowering global emissions output. Applying the BAT standard
to competitive imports would force domestic industry to reorient toward using
the best available technologies and to research even better ones in order to
increase competitiveness.
To those who would argue that applying this standard to imported
products but not to the domestic products for which more accurate data is
necessarily available (because mandated by law) unfairly privileges foreign
competitors in the home market, recall the arguments made in Section III above
that, in the medium to long term, the forced internalization of environmental
costs into private costs of production leads inevitably to greater efficiency and
hence to more competitive products on the global marketplace.112
Finally, recall that the concern of emissions leakage which BCA-type
mechanisms seek to obviate arises precisely because a significant portion of
high-emitting producers are likely to remain inadequately regulated by the
country of origin to achieve UNFCCC objectives, despite ongoing international
negotiations in that respect.113 BCA costs imposed on such products at the
point of their entry onto a Party’s market for final consumption are therefore
much closer in value to the actual climate costs imposed by their production
than the regulations imposed on them by the countries of origin which thus far
have been often deemed to be inadequate. The use of a BAT standard—to be
used, again, only where information about actual GHG emissions per total
production volume in the relevant compliance period is not reliably available—
serves to assure that WTO Members’ BCA measures are not in violation of
their obligations under GATT. Consider, by contrast, the kinds of alternative
standards that have been proposed as part of U.S. legislative drafts including a
112. Another argument against the use of a best available technology standard in the way
that I propose may be that it raises anew the threat meant to be avoided by using the BCA in the
first place. That is, if domestic producers (major domestic GHG emitters) are feared to relocate
to jurisdictions that impose lower GHG costs on production if their final products are still
allowed access to the U.S. market, then why wouldn’t they similarly relocate outside of the U.S.
to gain the benefit of having the best available technology standard applied to their products,
rather than their actual emissions? The answer is that a balance has to be struck between the
threat of emissions leakage in the event of no BCA measures and the threat of a challenge to a
BCA scheme on grounds of its being incompatible with GATT Article III and/or Article XX’s
chapeau, to mitigate which latter I propose that the incentive to relocate given the introduction
of a best available technology standard upon market re-entry is a lot lower than the incentive to
do so in the face of no BCA at all. Further, relocation requires a certain threshold of expected
net benefits, and the BCA costs, even assuming a BAT standard, may be sufficient to prevent
this threshold from being reached in enough cases that the effectiveness and environmental
integrity of domestic GHG regulation may be sufficiently assured to satisfy the BCA objectives.
113. See supra Section II.
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BCA measure. As the next Section will show, these proposals—in contrast to
the GATT-legal BCA design proposed above—are designed in such a way that
they are likely to lead to a challenge in the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). Unlike the BCA described above, these proposals appear to rest their
WTO legality on the GATT Exceptions regime, as the implementation of their
current design is unlikely to survive facial challenge.
To summarize, I have argued that a national cap-and-trade scheme which
places an absolute114 cap on the total permissible quantity of tCO2e emitted in
the course of a given compliance period115 and then offers an equivalent
number of tradable tCO2e allowances by market auction116 should be conceived
as an internal tax on every tCO2e emitted in the course of producing certain
products. In accordance with a well-designed BCA, just as domestic
production within the relevant industrial sectors would be taxed in (roughly) the
amount of externality to the global climate effected by their total production
within a given compliance period, in the form of total tonnage of GHG
emissions (assuming 100% governmental allowance auctioning), so too a
similar ‘tax’ would be imposed on like imported products upon entry into the
U.S. market.
V. Analysis of Recent Important Proposals for U.S. BCA
A significant number of legislative proposals for a national climate change
response program have been proposed in the U.S. Congress.117 Four in
114. For the sake of analytical simplicity, I say ‘absolute’ nation-wide cap. Nevertheless,
the analysis is adaptable (though somewhat more complex) to cap-and-trade proposals which
include provisions for a ‘safety valve’ or an ‘allowance reserve’, which seek to mitigate against
the threat of extreme allowance scarcity. See Jacoby & Ellerman, supra note 89, at 4.
115. Enforcement mechanisms for ensuring that the absolute limit of permissible GHG tons
emitted in the course of a given compliance period is not breached are beyond the scope of this
paper. It is clear, however, that if penalty fees are assessed for every tCO2e emitted in excess of
allowances held, the fees should be designed to exceed the market value of a GHG allowance.
116. See Dallas Burtraw et al., The Effect of Allowance Allocation on the Cost of Carbon
Emission Trading, (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 01–30, 2001), available at
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-01-30.pdf. (arguing that most economists agree that the
most efficient way of allocating individual tCO2e allowances is by government auction.)
Although immediate 100% auctioning may, due to powerful industry pressure, be politically
unpalatable, most legislative proposals envision a gradual transition toward eventual 100%
governmental auctioning of the totality of emissions allowances pertaining to each compliance
period. Again, the analysis is somewhat complicated by this political reality (because, in
determining the level of border adjustment required, the quantity of allowances allocated to
domestic industry at no cost must be taken into account), but is structurally the same.
117. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING
SYSTEM 25-29 (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2009), at Table 1A.2, Major
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particular have been the subject of significant discussion. These are the
Lieberman-Warner bill in the U.S. Senate, which will be considered here on the
basis of the version that appears in the Boxer amendment introduced on May
20, 2008;118 the Boucher-Dingell discussion draft,119 introduced on October 7,
2008 in the U.S. House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee;
the Waxman-Markey bill,120 approved by the same Committee on May 21,
2009; and the American Clean Energy and Security Act, passed in the U.S.
House of Representatives on June 26, 2009.121
All four drafts would seek to place mandatory quantitative restrictions on
the GHG emissions of a number of U.S. industrial sectors in the context of a
GHG emissions cap-and-trade scheme; however, each would only do so
provided that protections are included to prevent competitive advantage
accruing to imports from countries which benefit from low production costs
due to a lack of restrictions on GHG emissions.122 To that end, all four
proposals include provisions for the possible establishment of a border
adjustment scheme (called the International Reserve Allowance Program, but
hereinafter the “BCA”) designed to mitigate incentives for emissions leakage,
aiming “to ensure, to the maximum extent practicable, that greenhouse gas
emissions occurring outside the United States do not undermine the objectives
of the United States in addressing global climate change.”123 They envision
two different types of relations between the proposed U.S. system and the
climate regulatory schemes of other States. On the one hand, the scheme
contemplates recognition of certain foreign and international schemes as
functionally equivalent. On the other hand, when products seeking access to
the U.S. market originate in a State whose climate regulatory program is not
Climate Change Bills of the 110th Congress (With Competitiveness Provisions).
118. S. 2191, § 6001(10).
119. Boucher-Dingell Discussion Draft, supra note 83.
120. Waxman-Markey Discussion Draft, supra note 47.
121. ACESA (House), H.R. 2454, supra note 47.
122. In Waxman-Markey and ACESA (House), this is not the primary way of allaying
competitiveness concerns; rather, the draft proposes to rebate the costs of compliance to GHGintensive industry subject to competitiveness concerns, with the BCA provisions serving as a
back-up. See discussion in this regard in Section I above.
123. See S. 2191, at § 6002(2); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, at § 782(2); WaxmanMarkey, supra note 47, at § 412(2). This language was replaced in the ACESA (House) by a
statement of purpose providing that the BCA is to be established “consistent with international
agreements to which the United States is a party, in a manner that minimizes the likelihood of
carbon leakage as a result of differences between (A) the direct and indirect costs of complying
with [the Act] and (B) the direct and indirect costs, if any, of complying in other countries with
[GHG] regulatory programs, requirements, export tariffs, or other measures adopted or imposed
to reduce [GHG] emissions.” H.R. 2454, at § 768(a)(2).
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recognized by the U.S. as functionally equivalent to its own, the scheme would
impose U.S. regulatory power upon these foreign products by approximating
the level of cost imposed upon the global climate in the course of their
production,124 and assessing such cost at the U.S. border.
A. GATT Article I – “General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment”
The BCA envisioned by the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer and BoucherDingell drafts categorizes all foreign states as either covered by or excluded
from the scheme’s requirements, as designated by a “covered list” and an
“excluded list,” respectively, which is to be developed and published in the
Federal Register prior to the start of each relevant compliance period.125 The
lists are intended to be comprehensive and mutually exclusive: all countries not
on the excluded list must appear on the covered list, and vice versa.126
Accordingly, all countries127 exporting covered products128 into the U.S. are to
124. Although the impetus of the BCA is to equalize the costs imposed on imports with
those imposed upon like domestic producers, it may also be conceived as an approximation of
the cost of production to the global climatic system, as this is what GHG costs imposed on the
domestic producer are themselves intended to approximate.
125. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(b); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 786(b).
Note, however, that in the Lieberman-Warner proposed legislation, the BCA would be required
to start a full calendar year earlier than the deadline for publication of the covered and excluded
lists in the Federal Register. Compare Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(b)(1) with id. §
6006(a)(1).
126. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(b)(3)(B); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, §
786(b)(3)(B).
127. All four drafts exclude countries of origin that have been designated by the United
Nations as least developed countries, as well as those whose total annual GHG emissions are
determined not to exceed 0.5% of total GHG emissions worldwide, from being subject to the
BCA. See Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, at §§ 6006(b)(2)(A)(ii) & 6006(b)(2)(B); BoucherDingell, supra note 83, §§ 786(b)(2)(A)(iii) & 786(b)(2)(B); Waxman-Markey, supra note 47,
§ 416(a)(C); ACESA (House), supra note 47.
128. The term “covered good” is defined as “a good that (as identified by the [EPA]
Administrator by rule) (A) is a primary product [Boucher-Dingell: or manufactured item for
consumption]; (B) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the good, a substantial quantity
of direct greenhouse gas emissions and indirect greenhouse gas emissions; and (C) is closely
related to a good the cost of production of which in the United States is affected by a
requirement of [the] Act [Waxman-Markey: closely related to a good of the United States that
is affected by a requirement of title VII of the Clean Air Act].” Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, §
6001(5); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 781(7); Waxman-Markey, supra note 47, § 411(1).
“Primary product” is defined as “(A) iron, steel, [Boucher-Dingell; Waxman-Markey:
steel mill products (including pipe and tube),] aluminum, cement, bulk [Boucher-Dingell;
Waxman-Markey: delete “bulk”] glass [Boucher-Dingell; Waxman-Markey: (including flat,
container, and specialty glass and fiberglass)], or paper [House Boucher-Dingell; WaxmanMarkey: pulp, paper, chemicals, and industrial ceramics]; or [Boucher-Dingell; Waxman-
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be assessed for ‘comparability in effect’ in terms of their respective GHG
regulatory programs, if any129—countries that have “taken action comparable to
that taken by the United States to limit [their] greenhouse gas emissions”130 are
to be placed on the excluded list, such that products originating in those
countries are not subject to adjustment in accordance with the U.S. BCA. An
importer from a country that is not on the excluded list but that possesses
allowances issued pursuant to a binding emissions cap can submit those to
satisfy its adjustment assessment, provided again that the foreign program in
accordance with which the allowances were issued “represents a comparable
action” to that of the U.S. cap-and-trade program.131 An importer of a covered
Markey: “and” replaces “or”] (B) any other manufactured product that (i) is sold in bulk for
purposes of further manufacture [Boucher-Dingell; Waxman-Markey: or inclusion in a finished
product]; and (ii) generates, in the course of the manufacture of the product, direct greenhouse
gas emissions and [Boucher-Dingell; Waxman-Markey: replace “and” with “or”] indirect
greenhouse gas emissions that are comparable (on an emissions-per-dollar [Waxman-Markey:
emissions-per-output] basis) to emissions generated in the manufacture of products by covered
facilities in the industrial sector [Waxman-Markey: the manufacture of products listed in
subparagraph (A)].” Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6001(10); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 781(16); Waxman-Markey, supra note 47, § 411(3).
In the Boucher-Dingell draft, the additional term “manufactured item for
consumption” in the definition of “covered good” is itself further defined as “any good or
product (A) that is not a primary product; (B) that generates, in the course of the manufacture, a
substantial quantity of direct greenhouse gas emissions or indirect greenhouse gas emissions,
including emissions attributable to the inclusion of a primary product in the manufactured item
for consumption; and (C) for which the [newly established International Climate Change]
Commission, in consultation with the [EPA] Administrator, determines that the application of
an international reserve allowance requirement under [the BCA] to the particular category of
goods or products is technically and administratively feasible and necessary to achieve the
purposes of this part.” Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 781(14).
129. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6001(2); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 781(4)(A).
130. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(b)(2)(A)(i); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(b)(2)(A)(i).
131. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(e)(1)(A); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(e)(1)(A). Both proposals specify that the determination of comparability for this
particular purpose is to be made in the affirmative for “any greenhouse gas regulatory program
adopted by a covered foreign country to limit the greenhouse gas emissions of the covered
foreign country,” Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(e)(1)(B); Boucher-Dingell, supra note
76, § 786(e)(1)(B), if it is certified (certification is made by the President in the LiebermanWarner draft, or the EPA Administrator in the Boucher-Dingell draft. Id.) that the program in
fact places a quantitative limitation on the GHG emissions of the relevant covered good, that
this limitation is subject to an allowance trading system, that the program satisfies relevant
enforceability criteria (relevant enforceability criteria are to be established by the President
(Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191) or EPA Administrator (Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83), id.), and
that the program is a “comparable action,” as defined by the proposals.
“Comparable action” is defined, in general, as “any greenhouse gas regulatory
programs, requirements, and other measures adopted by a foreign country that, in combination,
are comparable in effect to actions carried out by the United States [Boucher-Dingell, supra
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good from a country not on the excluded list that does not possess a sufficient
number of eligible foreign allowances or credits will be assessed a climate cost
adjustment at the U.S. border.132 Importers falling within this category would
be required to purchase and retire an appropriate number of ‘international
reserve allowances,’133 drawn from a special reserve set up separately and in
addition to the national tCO2e cap,134 at a price and quantity determined in
accordance with a methodology to be established by EPA regulation.135
In the Waxman-Markey draft, the U.S. BCA would be triggered if the
President determines that “direct and indirect compliance costs, as mitigated by
[rebates] provided” are causing significant reduction or slowed growth136 in
domestic production or employment, or if the President determines that these
same compliance costs are causing a significant increase in GHG emissions “by
foreign manufacturing facilities that manufacture or produce covered goods and
that do not have greenhouse gas compliance obligations commensurate with
those that would apply in the United States.”137 Once the BCA is thus
note 83: through Federal, State, and local measures] to limit greenhouse gas emissions
[pursuant to relevant determination procedures specified by each proposal] [Lieberman-Warner,
S. 2191: taking into consideration the level of economic development of the foreign country].”
Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6001(2); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 781(4). The
different requirements in each proposal regarding the comparability determination are discussed
more fully below.
132. See Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(c) (discussing written declarations);
Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 786(c) (discussing declarations generally).
133. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(c)(2)(A); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§§ 786(c)(3)(D)(i)–(ii).
134. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(a)(2); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(a)(2).
135. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(a)(3); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(a)(4)(A). Under the Lieberman-Warner draft legislation, the EPA Administrator must
establish by rule a methodology for determining the price for each compliance year so as not to
exceed the market price of allowances issued for domestic compliance; the price cannot in any
case exceed the clearing price for the relevant compliance year established at the most recent
domestic auction. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(a)(3). In the Boucher-Dingell draft
legislation, supra note 83, the established price-determining methodology must require the EPA
to follow the following formula with respect to each day that international reserve allowances
are offered for sale: (step 1) Identify “3 leading publicly reported daily price indices for the
sale of [domestic] emissions allowances” providing the market clearing price for domestic
allowances on the previous day; (step 2) Calculate the arithmetic mean of the prices given by
each of the indices identified in step 1; the daily price of international reserve allowances must
then equal the result obtained in step 2. Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 786(a)(4)(B). The
provisions governing the determination of the quantity of required allowances are discussed
below.
136. The phrase used is “reduction in existing, or failure to initiate new.” WaxmanMarkey, supra note 47, § 414(b).
137. Id. § 414(b)(3) (emphasis added). This part of the triggering mechanism also includes

148

1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 107 (2010)

triggered, “any sector or subsector for which the President made [such] an
affirmative finding” would be required to submit an appropriate number of
GHG allowances upon entry into the U.S. market, at a price and quantity to be
determined by EPA regulation.138 Similarly, the ACESA (House) includes a
BCA-triggering mechanism, pursuant to which BCA would be established in
2018 (unless the President or Congress determines that BCA would not be in
the U.S. economic or environmental interest139) upon the President’s
determination that fifteen or more percent of merchandise in certain eligible
industrial sector(s)140 was imported from countries of origin which are either
not a party to a multilateral or bilateral emission reduction agreement for that
sector to which the U.S. is a party, or are not party to an international
agreement (to which the U.S. is also party) mandating “nationally enforceable
and economy-wide GHG reduction commitment” which is “at least as stringent
as that of the United States,” or whose annual energy or GHG intensity for that
sector is greater than that for such sector in the U.S.141
Accordingly, all four of the most debated U.S. BCA proposals would
essentially classify products according to their country of origin—subjecting
them to adjustment at the border or not on the basis of a determination
regarding not their particular production’s effect on global atmospheric GHG
concentrations but the nature of their country of origin’s (or, in the WaxmanMarkey and ACESA (House) drafts, a small percentage of all countries of
origin) GHG regulatory scheme as a whole. As Professors Howse and Regan
point out, country-based restrictions are “presumptively illegal” under the
GATT, immediately moving the inquiry to the possibility of justification under
the General Exceptions regime of GATT Article XX.142 The textual
the requirement that the relevant increase in GHG emissions is “caused by incremental cost
increases resulting from compliance with [the national cap-and-trade legislation].” Id.
§ 414(b)(3)(B). However, this requirement is superfluous, given that § 414(b)—the larger
paragraph of which sub-paragraph 414(b)(3) is a part—already states that the findings referred
to in the listed sub-paragraphs (1) through (3) are relevant only in so far as they find the changes
to have been caused by the direct and indirect costs of compliance with the national cap and
trade scheme. Id. § 414(b).
138. Id. § 416(a). The usual exemptions, common to all three legislative drafts considered
here, apply: countries identified by the United Nations as least developed countries, as well as
those that the President determines are responsible for less than 0.5 percent of total GHG
emissions, are exempt.
Id. § 416(a)(C); see also Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191,
§ 6006(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also id. § 6006(b)(2)(B); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(b)(2)(A)(iii); see also id. § 786(b)(2)(B).
139. ACESA (House), H.R. 2454, § 767(b)(1).
140. See supra note 83 for ACESA (House)’s definition of his term.
141. ACESA (House), H.R. 2454, § 767(c).
142. Howse & Regan, Product/Process, supra note 85, at 270.
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justification for this shift is Article I of the General Agreement—“General Most
Favored Nation Treatment”143—under which “any advantage, favour, privilege
or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories
of all other contracting parties.”144 The policy justification, based on the
GATT’s objective purpose,145 is that “distinctions of nationality are irrelevant
to economic efficiency. Products which differ only in their nationality should
have the same competitive opportunities.”146
It is true that the recognition of the functional equivalence of other
Members’ regulatory regimes is deemed appropriate and encouraged under
WTO law in the context of ensuring that basic product quality standards are
met by all products entering the market, as governed by the WTO Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT).147 Nevertheless, it should not escape
emphasis that the Most Favored Nation principle appears within the very first
article of the very first international trade agreement, and that no provision
comparable to Article 6 of the TBT exists in the GATT. There is no provision
in the General Agreement that allows for the discrimination among products
based on their countries of origin when some Members but not others are
granted the privilege of having their regulatory regimes considered to be
functionally equivalent to that of the importing Member. The only exceptions
to Article I of the GATT are the general exceptions that appear in Article XX,
discussed below.

143. GATT, supra note 83, art. I:1 (“With respect to customs duties and charges of any
kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation [...], and with respect to the
method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, and with respect to all matters referred to in
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties.”).
144. Id.
145. See Howse & Regan, Product/Process, supra note 85, at 265 (arguing that the
“objective purpose” of a legal instrument may be determined by “considering its provisions,
structure, and political and historical context”).
146. Id. at 270.
147. See WTO, Agreement on Technical Barrier to Trade, Art. 6, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbtagr_e.htm (providing that “Members shall ensure,
whenever possible, that results of conformity assessment procedures in other Members are
accepted, even when those procedures differ from their own, provided that they are satisfied that
those procedures offer an assurance of conformity with applicable technical regulations or
standards equivalent to their own procedures.”).

150

1 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV'T 107 (2010)

Before getting to the general exceptions regime, however, consider that
even were the approval of functional equivalence regimes embodied in the TBT
to be read into the interpretation of GATT Article I as a matter of treaty
interpretation under the Vienna Convention,148 these legislative proposals for a
U.S. BCA, unlike the BCA design proposed in Section IV above, are designed
in such a way as to also invite a challenge by affected Members under the
national treatment provisions GATT Article III, as discussed in the next
subsection.
B. GATT Article III—“National Treatment on Internal Taxation and
Regulation”
Existing legislative proposals for a U.S. BCA also leave themselves open
to challenge under GATT Article III by countries of origin which fail the
comparability determination, whose products are assessed climate adjustment
costs in accordance with the BCA design proposed. Recall that GATT Article
III generally requires that a Member’s charges, laws, regulations, and
requirements affecting the internal sale of products must not be applied in a
protectionist manner, and that charges imposed on imports “in excess of” those
applied on like domestic products or regulations providing “less favorable”
treatment to imports than like domestic products fall automatically within the
scope of the prohibition.149
All four legislative proposals for a U.S. BCA would require the EPA
Administrator to establish by regulation a methodology for calculating the
quantity of international reserve allowances required for each category of
covered good.150 While the Waxman-Markey and ACESA (House) drafts do
not provide any further guidance with respect to what such methodology would
look like,151 the detail provided in this regard by the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer
and Boucher-Dingell drafts is instructive in evaluating the proposed BCA’s
consistency with GATT Article III.

148. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 31(3)(c) (stating that international
agreements are to be interpreted in light of other relevant agreements entered into by the
parties).
149. See supra Section IV.
150. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(d)(1)(A); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83,
§ 786(d)(1)(A); Waxman-Markey, supra note 47, §§ 416(a)(1)(A) & (B); ACESA (House),
H.R. 2454, § 768(a)(1)(C).
151. See generally Waxman-Markey, supra note 47, § 416; ACESA (House), H.R. 2454,
§ 768.
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In the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer draft, the BCA adjustment requirement
kicks in only if the country of origin’s total GHG emissions attributable to the
relevant good during the most recent year for which information is available are
greater than that country’s emissions attributable to that sector during the
baseline established by the Act (an average of the years 2012 through 2014).152
If the country of origin’s relevant sectoral emissions in the most recent year are
higher than its baseline, then the per production unit BCA adjustment
requirement is to be the number of excessive GHG emissions per unit of good
produced in that country, adjusted to take into account the economic
development of that country, as well as to take into account the number of
domestic allowances provided to the like domestic sector at no cost per unit of
domestic production.153
In the Boucher-Dingell draft, the methodology to be established by the
EPA Administrator to quantify BCA adjustment requirements for covered
goods from covered countries would not depend on a baseline threshold.
Rather, the per production unit adjustment required is to equal the GHG
emissions attributable to the relevant category of good in the covered country
during the most recent year, per unit of production during that year, which is to
be adjusted to account for the number of allowances the producer would have
received at no cost if situated in the U.S. The requirement may also be adjusted
“to account for the extent to which” the foreign country “implemented, verified,
and enforced” the use of GHG emissions-reducing techniques, technologies,
and regulatory programs or requirements.154
Under both the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer and the Boucher-Dingell
proposals, therefore, importers of covered goods from countries not excluded
from BCA participation, by way of a comparability determination or otherwise,
would be assessed GHG adjustment requirements based not on individualized
calculations regarding the GHGs actually emitted during the import’s
production, but rather based on a standardized formula using statistical
averages of the GHGs emitted in the course of the country of origin’s overall
production of the relevant category of good during the most recent year for
which data are available.155 Thus, a steel importer from China, for example, no
152. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6001(1). In making this determination, the EPA
Administrator is required to rely on the best available relevant data for that period, as well as
economic or engineering models or best available information on technology performance
levels, to the extent necessary. Id. at §§ 6001(1)(A)–(B).
153. Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(d).
154. Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 786(d).
155. See Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 6006(d) (discussing the quantity of allowances
required); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 786(d) (discussing the quantity of allowances
required).
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matter how innovative at reducing GHG-intensity in its production processes,
would be required to buy and retire allowances not in the amount of GHGs
actually emitted during that steel’s production, but rather in the amount of the
average GHGs emitted by steel producers, both GHG-efficient and not, in
China during the most recent year. A domestic steel producer, on the other
hand, would only be required to acquire and retire allowances or credits in the
amount of its actual GHG emissions.156
Importantly, in U.S. Gasoline157 a WTO Panel158 examined a Member’s
obligations under GATT Article III in the context of environmental regulations
which similarly sought to assess requirements upon imports which, while
ostensibly designed to equalize the requirements for imports with similar
requirements on like domestic products, were made on the basis of statistical
averages rather than the individual assessment options offered to domestic
producers. The U.S. EPA regulations at issue in that case had, inter alia,
required stabilization or reduction159 of gasoline pollutant emissions relative to
1990-levels, allowing domestic refiners160 who began operations prior to mid156. See Lieberman-Warner, S. 2191, § 1202 (discussing the compliance obligation);
Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 712 (discussing the compliance obligation).
157. WTO, United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel
Report, WT/DS2/R, Jan. 29, 1996 [hereinafter US—Gasoline, Panel].
158. Although the Panel’s analysis with respect to GATT Article XX was later invalidated
by the WTO AB, see United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
AB Report, WT/DS2/AB/R, Apr. 29, 1996 [hereinafter US—Gasoline, AB] at 29, its analysis
with respect to GATT Article III was not appealed, see id. at 9 (noting that the U.S. did not
appeal the Panel’s findings or rulings with respect to, inter alia, Article III), and hence remains a
good indication of the DSB’s approach to Article III in the context of environmental
regulations.
159. The regulations categorized gasoline according to its final place of sale, requiring
“reformulated gasoline” in highly polluted metropolitan areas—with performance specifications
of reduced emissions from 1990-levels—and “conventional gasoline,” with emissions stabilized
at 1990 levels, for other areas. US—Gasoline, Panel, supra note 157, ¶¶ 2.2–2.4.
160. In fact, some domestic entities—blenders and domestic refiners with limited 1990
operations—were required to follow the same baseline establishment requirements as importers.
Id. ¶ 6.3. The U.S. had argued that the regulation’s distinction between these kinds of domestic
entities and imports, on the one hand, and other domestic refiners on the other, “was justified
because importers, like domestic refiners with limited 1990 operations and blenders, could not
reliably establish their 1990 gasoline quality, lacked consistent sources and quality of gasoline,
or had the flexibility to meet a statutory baseline since they were not constrained by refinery
equipment and crude supplies.” Id. ¶ 6.11. Accordingly, the U.S. argued that “the requirements
of Article III:4 [were] met because imported gasoline [was] treated similarly to gasoline from
similarly situated domestic parties. Id. (emphasis in original). The Panel rejected this
argument, stating that “Article III:4 of the General Agreement deals with the treatment to be
accorded to like products; its wording does not allow less favourable treatment dependent on the
characteristics of the producer and the nature of the data held by it.” Id. (citing WTO, U.S.—
Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, BISD 39S/206, June 19, 1992, ¶ 5.19
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1990 to use ‘historic’ methods to determine their personalized 1990 baselines,
but, fearing a lack of reliable information for foreign emission-levels, requiring
importers and blenders using imports to use a statutory baseline, based on
average 1990 U.S. gasoline quality.161 Venezuela, later joined by Brazil,
objected to this discrimination.162 Venezuela and Brazil argued that imported
gasoline was “like” U.S. domestic gasoline, and that it received “less
favourable” treatment under the contested EPA regulations because, unlike
their domestic counterparts, gasoline importers were not allowed to establish
their individualized 1990 baselines using secondary or tertiary data.
The Panel considered the various criteria applicable to a determination
regarding the likeness of products for purposes of Article III,163 and concluded
(rejecting a tax regulation according less favorable treatment to beer on the basis of the size of
the producer)). The Panel also noted that accepting the U.S. argument “would mean that the
treatment of imported and domestic goods concerned could no longer be assured on the
objective basis of their likeness as products. Rather, imported goods would be exposed to a
highly subjective and variable treatment according to extraneous factors,” and that “[t]his would
thereby create great instability and uncertainty in the conditions of competition as between
domestic and imported goods in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with the object and
purpose of Article III.” Id. ¶ 6.12.
161. Id.
162. Venezuela had actually initiated its complaint under the old GATT system. The U.S.
responded by proposing to alter the regulations to allow more flexibility in developing
personalized baselines if Venezuela agreed to drop its claim; Venezuela agreed and the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began a public comment period on suggestions for
change. However, U.S. environmentalists and domestic refiners (environmental as well as
protectionist interests) joined forces in the U.S. Congress to block the EPA from implementing
the suggested changes. Taking advantage of the new WTO dispute settlement system (unlike
the old GATT system, where Panel reports required unanimous backing in order to be adopted
as binding, the WTO system presumes adoption in the absence of unanimous agreement to the
contrary), Venezuela re-filed its claim in the WTO. See Steve Charnovitz, The WTO Panel
Decision On U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, Int’l Env. Rep. No. 5 (March 6, 1996) (discussing
Venezuela’s legal strategy). The union of environmental and protectionist interests in support
of trade restrictions was also a motivating force behind the U.S. legislation challenged in
Shrimp/Turtle, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R. See Turtle Island Restoration
Network v. Evans, 284 F.3d 1282, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The Senators who spoke in favor [of
the bill that became the law at issue in Shrimp/Turtle] (none spoke against) feared that American
shrimpers would be at a disadvantage competing in the domestic market with foreign shrimpers,
who were not burdened with [Turtle Excluding Device] regulations.”). A similar union will
likely support BCA legislation as well.
163. Specifically, the Panel noted that these various criteria, applied by previous panels,
had been summarized in the 1970 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustments, see id.,
supra note 93, ¶ 18, that these same criteria had been applied by the panel in the 1987 Japan
Alcohol case in the context of determining likeness for purposes of Article III:2, and that “[t]he
Panel considered that those criteria were also applicable to the examination of like products
under Article III:4.” US—Gasoline, Panel, supra note 157, ¶ 6.8. See also EC—Asbestos, AB
Report, supra note 108 (examining product likeness under GATT Article III:4 with the help of
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that “chemically-identical imported and domestic gasoline by definition have
exactly the same physical characteristics, end-uses, tariff classifications, and are
perfectly substitutable,” and that they are therefore like products under Article
III.164 The Panel then also concluded that imported gasoline was treated less
favorably than like domestic gasoline. Importers were unlikely to have
sufficient information to establish an individualized baseline165 and, unlike their
domestic counterparts, they were prevented from using secondary or tertiary
data to establish (approximated) individualized baselines. Accordingly, “under
the baseline establishment methods, imported gasoline was effectively
prevented from benefitting from as favourable sales conditions as were afforded
domestic gasoline by an individual baseline tied to the producer of a
product.”166 Specifically, the Panel pointed out that under the baseline
establishment requirements at issue, imported gasoline that could not meet the
statutory baseline, but could have met an individualized baseline established
according to secondary or tertiary data, would be prevented from market access
whereas chemically identical domestic gasoline would not be, and that there
was evidence that this had in fact occurred.167 Accordingly, the EPA
regulations were found violative of Article III:4.168
the criteria outlined in the 1970 Working Party Report on Border Tax Adjustment, and noting, at
¶ 101, that “[t]he Report of the Working Party of Border Tax Adjustments outlined an approach
for analyzing ‘likeness’ that has been followed and developed since by several panels and the
Appellate Body”).
164. US—Gasoline, Panel, supra note 157, at ¶ 6.9.
165. See id. at ¶ 6.3 (“Importers are also required to use an individual baseline, but only in
the case (unlikely, according to the parties to the dispute) that they are able to establish it using
Method 1 data.”).
166. Id. at ¶ 6.16.
167. See id. ¶ 6.10.
168. In US—Gasoline, the Panel examined a Member’s obligations under GATT Art. III:4.
The way in which the BCA provisions within the U.S. legislative proposals considered here are
currently designed suggests that this is also the paragraph that will be most relevant to their
analysis under GATT Art. III. See Robert Howse & Antonia Eliason, Domestic and
International Strategies to Address Climate Change: An Overview of the WTO Legal Issues
(2009), at 29 n.37 (noting that in United States—Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal
Sale and Use of Tobacco, Panel Report, DS44/R, 12 Aug. 1994, ¶ 82, “the adopted GATT panel
found that a measure that provided for an assessment or penalty where a certain domestic
regulatory requirement was not met by an imported product was an ‘internal law, regulation, or
requirement’ within the meaning of Article III:4, and not a fiscal measure within the meaning of
III:2,” and that a “proposed application of an ‘allowance’ requirement to imports,” such as may
be seen in the current U.S. legislative proposals, is likely to be characterized “not as a tax or
charge, . . . but as ancillary to the enforcement or administration of a US regulatory scheme that
applies to both domestic and imported products”). However, note that these proposals, contrary
to the BCA design argued for in Section IV above, do not appear to be written with the intent of
being presented in the WTO as essentially a tax adjustment scheme, to be analyzed under
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Arguably, the proposed U.S. legislation described above presents a
situation similar to that presented in US—Gasoline.169 As mentioned, under
both the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer and Boucher-Dingell proposals, importers
of covered goods from covered countries would be assessed GHG adjustment
requirements based on standardized formulas using statistical averages of the
GHGs emitted in the course of the country of origin’s total production of the
relevant category of good in the most recent year for which data are available,
whereas domestic producers of like products would be assessed costs on the
basis of their actual GHG emissions.170 As a result, on the Panel’s analysis in
US—Gasoline, because importers, unlike their like domestic counterparts, will
not be given the opportunity for climate cost assessment on the basis of their
products’ individualized emissions data, the proposed U.S. BCA is likely to be
found in prima facie violation of the national treatment provisions in GATT
Article III.
C. GATT Article XX—“General Exceptions”
In the plausible event that the kind of U.S. BCA scheme proposed within
the legislative drafts under consideration here is found violative of GATT
Article I or III (or any other article), it may nevertheless be defended, if
paragraph 2 of GATT Article III (prohibition on charges ‘in excess of’ those imposed on like
domestic products).
169. Howse & Eliason argue that “the approach of the Appellate Body in EC—Asbestos is
sufficiently flexible and sensitive to different kinds of differences between products mattering in
different factual and regulatory contexts, and that [BCA-]non-complying imported products
could be distinguished as unlike on the basis of the failure to control or internalise
environmental externalities in the production process.” Howse & Eliason, supra note 168, at
29. See also id. at 26–27. However, although it is true that the AB in EC—Asbestos stated that
“in examining the ‘likeness’ of products, panels must evaluate all of the relevant evidence,” and
that “the health risks associated with a product may be pertinent in an examination of ‘likeness’
under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994,” EC—Asbestos, supra note 108, ¶ 113 (emphasis
original), it also warned that its analysis “is a very narrow one, limited only to the circumstances
of this case, and confined to chrysotile asbestos fibres as compared with PCG fibres.” Id. ¶ 153.
The health risks of asbestos, considered in that case to be relevant to the ‘likeness’
determination, were directly linked to the physical composition of the product at issue. See id. ¶
114 (“In the case of chrysotile asbestos fibres, their molecular structure, chemical composition,
and fibrillation capacity are important because the microscopic particles and filaments of
chrysotile asbestos fibres are carcinogenic in humans, following inhalation.”). Accordingly, it
seems too uncertain a stretch of the AB’s reasoning to infer from this that the extremely
attenuated and uncertain potential health risks associated with the contribution of a good’s
production process to global atmospheric GHG concentrations could render chemically-identical
imported and domestic products “unlike” for Article III:4 purposes.
170. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
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properly designed, on the basis of the General Exceptions listed in GATT
Article XX. In relevant part to defending a GHG-management-related scheme,
Article XX reads:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party
of measures:
...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption . . . .171

1. Provisional Justification Under XX(b) and XX(g)
Provisional justification of a prima facie violation of GATT Articles I or
III under GATT Article XX, subparagraph (b) requires that the measure
seeking justification be structured in such a way that it is “necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health.”172 GATT Article XX(b), although more
difficult to invoke than XX(g) because of the ‘necessity’ requirement, discussed
below, may nevertheless be worth arguing, due to the desirability of a finding
that BCAs are in fact necessary to protect public and environmental health.
Because this would be such a strong finding, it would provide the BCA with a
high degree of protection from further challenges on trade liberalization
grounds. Also, it would be conceptually more desirable, because it would more
accurately reflect the gravity of the need to respond to climate change through
BCAs. Rather than merely ‘relating to’ the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources in the context of a justification under XX(g) (discussed below) BCA
would be seen to address a fundamental public health concern—emphasizing

171.
172.

GATT, supra note 83, art. XX.
Id. art. XX(b).
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that the global atmosphere and climate are not just exhaustible natural
resources, but the very foundation of public and environmental health.
Availing a given BCA of the GATT Article XX(b) defense, in addition to
meeting the requirements of Article XX’s chapeau—discussed below173—
requires two things of the BCA’s explicit design: the BCA’s policy objective
must be the protection of life or health of humans, plants, or animals; and the
BCA must actually be ‘necessary’ to achieve that objective.174 This latter
‘necessity’ determination in turn requires a finding that no reasonable less
trade-restrictive alternative to the measure at issue exists that the contracting
party could reasonably have been expected to employ,175 and has a sliding
threshold, depending on the extent to which the policy objective is a truly
important, vital interest.176
Although commentators have noted that an Article XX defense for BCAs
may be difficult, given that their overt objective is to respond to
competitiveness concerns of domestic industry, BCAs are in fact necessary for,
and should be designed to serve, a needed response to a crucial health concern.
The predicted potential impacts of excessive atmospheric GHG concentrations
on human, animal, and plant health range from desertification, to extreme
natural disasters, to increased incidents of disease.177 As already mentioned,
173. In discussing the specific substantive provisions of GATT Article XX prior to
discussing its chapeau requirements, I follow the structure of Art. XX analysis outlined by the
WTO AB. See United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
Appellate Body Report, 12 October 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, ¶ 120 [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle,
AB Report] (“The task of interpreting the chapeau so as to prevent the abuse or misuse of the
specific exemptions provided for in Article XX is rendered very difficult, if indeed it remains
possible at all, where the interpreter . . . has not first identified and examined the specific
exception threatened with abuse.”); U.S.—Gasoline, AB Report, supra note 158, at 22 (“The
[GATT Art. XX] analysis is . . . two-tiered: first, provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under XX(g) [or XX(b)]; second, further appraisal of the same
measure under the introductory clauses of Article XX.”).
174. See, e.g., EC—Asbestos, AB Report, supra note 108, ¶¶ 155–175; de Cendra, Border
Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at 144 n.122.
175. de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at 144 n. 122; see also
Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, BISD 37S/200, 20
Feb. 1990, at ¶ 75 (holding that “import restrictions ... could be considered ‘necessary’ in terms
of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measure consistent with the General
Agreement, or less inconsistent with it, which [the Member] could reasonably be expected to
employ to achieve its health policy objectives”).
176. See Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 11 Dec. 2000, at ¶ 162–66 (explaining that
“[t]he more vital or important [the] common interests or values” sought to be protected, the
lower the threshold for a finding of ‘necessity’); Ismer & Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustments,
supra note 111, at 20.
177. See IPCC, FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT, supra note 3, at 29.
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because GHG emissions have global effect irrespective of their actual place of
emission, a contracting party may not sufficiently safeguard its population from
the impact of climate change by regulating internal emissions, especially when
forcing domestic industries to internalize substantial climate costs in their costs
of production may simply incentivize producers to relocate to less regulated
jurisdictions or otherwise increase production in less regulated jurisdictions,
maintaining dangerous emissions levels. Properly designed BCAs are meant to
protect against such emissions leakage, and hence arguably have as their object
and purpose the assurance that domestic climate response strategies are not
rendered ineffective by a continued presence in the marketplace of producers
who have simply relocated to avoid GHG regulation. Accordingly, it is
imperative that a well-designed BCA clearly state as its policy objective the
necessity to protect the integrity of domestic GHG caps against emissions
leakage, as the U.S. proposals under consideration here do,178 rather than
focusing on domestic competitiveness concerns.
Nevertheless, given the great uncertainty necessarily involved in any
significant response to climate change—from the fundamental uncertainty
regarding the exact causal relationship between anthropogenic GHG emissionabatement effort and complex climactic changes, to the uncertainty surrounding
the threat of emissions leakage itself—a BCA seeking justification under
GATT Article XX(b) may run into difficulties with its ‘necessity’ requirement.
Despite the gravity of risk associated with unchecked climate change,179 and
hence the importance of the BCA’s purported objective, these uncertainties in
connecting BCAs directly to measurable impacts on public and environmental
health may suggest to a WTO Panel and the Appellate Body that perhaps less
trade-restrictive alternatives—such as bi- and/or multi-lateral negotiation—may
in fact be just as or even more effective at achieving this policy objective than
trade-restrictive BCAs.180 In the event that, as I argued in Section II above,
good faith international negotiations do not yield a sufficiently stringent agreed
regulatory strategy, less trade-restrictive alternative BCA designs than these
GATT-violative proposals are also available—such as the BCA design
proposed in Section IV above.
If a GATT XX(b) defense to a BCA found violative of GATT provision is
unsuccessful, Article XX(g) may be used to defend the scheme. An Article
178. Lieberman-Warner, S. 3036, § 6002(2); Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 782(2);
Waxman-Markey, H.R. 2454, § 412(2); ACESA (House), H.R. 2454, 111th U.S. Cong. (2009),
§ 768(a)(2).
179. See, e.g., Stern Review, supra note 87.
180. See Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, (noting the presumptive preference for
multilateral negotiation of environmental policy, as opposed to unilateral trade restrictions).
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XX(g) defense requires that the measure seeking justification be structured
such that it “relat[es] to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources,” and
is “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption.”181
The conservation of global atmosphere—in the sense of maintaining
sustainable atmospheric GHG levels—may plausibly be argued to amount to
the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource. In US—Gasoline, for
example, a WTO panel noted that clean air was a natural resource that may be
depleted.182 A well-balanced global atmosphere is therefore similarly a natural
resource capable of anthropogenic exhaustion.
The determination of whether a given measure ‘relates to’ such
conservation requires a finding of “substantial relationship” between the
measure and the conservative purpose, which is to say that the measure cannot
be “merely incidentally or inadvertently aimed at” this objective.183 Given the
substantial quantity of economic analysis supporting the necessity of BCA to a
well-functioning and effective national GHG cap,184 such a relationship
arguably exists. US—Shrimp/Turtle, for example, dealt with a U.S. measure
that restricted market access to shrimp imported from countries that had not
instituted and enforced the mandatory use of turtle excluding devices (TEDs)
on shrimpers within their respective jurisdictions.185 Like stabilization of GHG
levels in the global atmosphere, conservation of highly migratory sea turtles is
impossible if conservation efforts are limited to the jurisdiction of one or even a
few countries: just as the atmospheric effect of GHG emissions abated in one
country may be offset by increased emissions from an unregulated jurisdiction,
the turtle conservation efforts of one State will be similarly neutralized if the
highly migratory animals are, due to lack of comparable regulation,
subsequently killed within the jurisdiction of another.186
181. GATT, supra note 83, art. XX(g).
182. US—Gasoline, Panel, supra note 157. See also de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments,
supra note 106, at 144 (noting that “[s]everal [WTO] panels have included within the term of
‘exhaustible natural resources’ animals, gasoline and even clean air”).
183. See, e.g., US—Gasoline, AB Report, supra note 158, ¶¶ 19–20.
184. See, e.g., de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at 144 (citing O.
Maestad, Efficient Climate Policy with Internationally Mobile Firms, 19 ENVTL. & RESOURCE
ECON. 267 (2001); Y. Dissou, Cost-Effectiveness of the Performance Standard System to Reduce
CO2 Emissions in Canada: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 27 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON.
187 (2005); W. Pizer, The Case for Intensity Targets, Discussion Paper 05–02 (Resources for
the Future, January 2005); D. Demailly & P. Quirion, The Competitiveness Impact of CO2
Emissions Reduction in the Cement Sector (COM/ENV/EPOC/CTPA/CFA (2004) final,
November 2005).
185. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173.
186. Id., First US Submission, ¶ 48.
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The AB found that a market access-conditioning measure seeking to
protect domestic conservation measures from being rendered ineffective was
“in principle, reasonably related to the end[]”187 of conserving an alocallyconcentrated global resource, given that the measure on its face excluded from
its scope of applicability countries “certified as having a fishing environment
that does not pose a threat of incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of
commercial shrimp trawl harvesting,”188 as well as those certified to have
“adopt[ed] a regulatory program that is comparable to that of the United States
program and to have a rate of incidental take of sea turtles that is comparable to
the average rate of United States’ vessels”189—that is, given that the measure
was explicitly designed to apply only to cases that could actually pose a
potential threat to the environmental integrity of the Member’s domestic
conservation measure.
Analogous to the U.S. regulations at issue in Shrimp/Turtle, border
adjustment schemes forcing importers’ internalization of climate costs are
designed to ensure the environmental integrity of domestic climate costinternalization regulation, by disincentivizing emissions leakage. Accordingly,
a well-designed BCA, with a carefully-calibrated scope of application, will be
similarly “in principle, reasonably related to the end[]” of ensuring the effective
functioning of domestic GHG management.
Finally, the requirement regarding domestic restrictions on production and
consumption is simply “a requirement of even-handedness” in imposing
restrictions on the production/ consumption of competitive domestic and
imported products.190 As Article XX is a list of exceptions to general GATT
obligations, however, this requirement must clearly be less stringent than the
national treatment provisions of GATT Article III. Accordingly, Article XX(g)
does not require identical restrictions on imports and domestic production,191
and may thus be an available defense in the case of BCAs which seek to avoid
costs associated with precisely equivalent border adjustment, and which are
187. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 141.
188. Id. at ¶ 139.
189. Id. at ¶ 140.
190. US—Gasoline, AB Report, supra note 158, ¶ 20 (“The [last] clause [in GATT Art.
XX(g)] is a requirement of even-handedness in the imposition of restrictions, in the name of
conservation, upon the production or consumption of exhaustible natural resources.”). See also
de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at 144 n.126 (noting that, “[i]n US—
Shrimp Turtle, . . . the Appellate Body referred explicitly to ‘even-handedness’”) (citing J.
WIERS, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT IN THE EC AND WTO—A LEGAL ANALYSIS 190 (Europa Law
Publishing, 2002)).
191. US—Gasoline, AB Report, supra note 158, ¶ 22; de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments,
supra note 106, at 144.
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consequently found to violate the strict national treatment provisions of GATT
Article III. Again, just as the regulations at issue in Shrimp/Turtle—which, like
the proposed BCA, were ostensibly structured to apply to importers the same
kinds of restrictions which were generally applied on domestic shrimpers192—a
BCA may in principle be seen as enough of an even-handed measure to pass
muster for provisional justification under Article XX(g).
2. Consistency with XX Chapeau
Satisfying the elements of Article XX(b) or XX(g) is nevertheless
insufficient to avail a Member State of a full GATT Article XX defense,193
whose chapeau additionally requires that the challenged measure must neither
be “applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions
prevail,” nor constitute a “disguised restriction on international trade.”194 As
the AB noted in Shrimp/Turtle, the chapeau to GATT Article XX should be
analyzed and applied as an expression of the principle of good faith, which
generally controls the exercise of legal rights.195
When evaluating a contracting party’s unilateral trade-restrictive measure
claiming exemption under Article XX, the WTO AB has considered a number
of factors in striking the balance between a public policy exception and the
overall systemic integrity required by Article XX’s chapeau. In considering a
party’s attempt to influence through trade another member’s policy regarding a
migratory or global resource—such as the conservation of migratory sea turtles
or GHG concentrations in the global atmosphere—failure to engage in serious
negotiations prior to taking unilateral action, a differential treatment toward
certain parties as compared with others, or strict inflexibility regarding the types
of measures another party may use to achieve the desired objective, are all
considerations that have counted against global public-policy related traderestrictions in determining their compatibility with Article XX’s chapeau.196
Accordingly, trade-restrictive global GHG management policy schemes such as
national BCAs should be carefully designed to manifest a reasonable and
192. US—Gasoline, AB Report, supra note 158, ¶ 144.
193. See, e.g., Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 157 (noting that “the ultimate
availability of the [GATT Article XX] exception is subject to the compliance by the invoking
Member with the requirements of the chapeau”).
194. GATT, supra note 83, art. XX.
195. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 158.
196. Id. ¶ 168; see also Ismer & Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 111, at 22.
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transparent sensitivity to the specificity of circumstances within and sovereign
autonomy of other WTO contracting parties (recall the arguments from
sovereign autonomy in favor of the BCA design argued for in Section III:B
above).197
In the BCA context, it has been argued that to avoid conflict with Article
XX’s chapeau, states “should accept removing BTA when a foreign member
can justify that it has adopted a climate programme comparable in effectiveness
to the domestic one vis-à-vis the relevant sectors.”198 As outlined above, this is
the strategy adopted by the most important pending U.S. legislative proposals.
I have argued instead for a reorientation of GHG management policy in the
context of industrial production so as to impose climate costs on all such
products seeking entry to the market, regardless of country of origin, and to
rebate such costs to all such products destined for consumption elsewhere, on
the understanding that climate costs may be imposed at the border of their
destination (provided that these costs do not exceed similar climate costs
imposed on like products produced and consumed in those countries). In this
Section, I will argue why the country-based approach of the current U.S. BCA
scheme design proposals is a less desirable alternative—a prima facie violation
of U.S. legal obligations under the GATT, and a design whose application is
likely to prove difficult to justify under the justification requirements of Article
XX’s chapeau.
Importantly, all but one of the drafts under consideration here explicitly
conceive foreign regulatory ‘comparability’ in terms of comparability “in
effect,”199 an explicit reference to the Shrimp/Turtle dispute, where the WTO’s
197. See Howse & Eliason, supra note 168, at 33 (“Policy choices that are reasonable,
transparent and objective taking into account the situations of different countries, and based on
sound regulation and science, will not violate the conditions of the chapeau [to GATT Article
XX] . . . . [U]nder the [AB] approach in Shrimp/Turtle, the question will be the extent to which
the scheme provides flexibility to achieve the environmental objectives in question through
approaches that may . . . differ from the US approach but may be more appropriate to the
conditions in the exporting country.”); de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at
145 (“The BTA should be designed in such a manner that allows for sufficient flexibility to take
into account the specific conditions prevailing in any country, which does not mean that it has to
take into account the specific conditions of every country.”).
198. de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at 145 (citing United States—
Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the
DSU by Malaysia, Appellate Body Report, ¶ 144, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)).
199. See Boucher-Dingell, supra note 83, § 781(4)(A) (defining “comparable action”
generally as those foreign regulatory measures or schemes that “are comparable in effect to
actions carried out by the United States”); id. § 783(b)(2)(B)(i) (expressing U.S. negotiating
policy to encourage comparability in terms of “comparab[ility] in effect”); Warner-Lieberman,
S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 6001(2) (defining “comparable action” in terms of “comparab[ility] in
effect”). The ACESA (House), supra note 47, appears to conceive comparability in terms of
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AB concluded that a U.S. measure conditioning market access on
environmental regulatory comparability determinations, while violative of U.S.
obligations under the GATT,200 may be justified under the GATT’s exceptions
regime if comparability is determined on the basis of “a requirement that the
U.S. and foreign programmes be ‘comparable in effectiveness.’”201 I will argue
that despite this explicit reference to WTO jurisprudence on the face of the U.S.
statutory proposals, the actual implementation of this standard, as interpreted by
the AB in Shrimp/Turtle, may be significantly more complex than a simple
analogy to the eventual resolution of the Shrimp/Turtle dispute would suggest.
In the Shrimp/Turtle WTO dispute, four shrimp-exporting States from the
Indian Ocean202 challenged a U.S. measure203 (“Section 609”) conditioning
market access to imported shrimp on their having been harvested with
commercial fishing technology which does not adversely affect sea turtles.204
Despite considerable flexibility on the face of Section 609’s implementation
guidelines—foreign turtle conservation schemes were to be certified as exempt
from the embargo if they were “comparable” to the U.S. conservation
effort205—in practice, competent U.S. authorities recognized only those foreign
either a state’s participation in an international or bilateral GHG management regime, requiring
that state to undertake GHG reductions quantitatively comparable to those required of the U.S.,
or else in terms of annual energy or GHG intensity. See American Clean Energy and Security
Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 768(c); see also id. at § 763(b)(2)(A)(ii) (defining energy/GHG
intensity).
200. Section 609 prohibited market access if certain conditions were not met, and was thus
properly analyzed under GATT Article XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions), whereas a
BCA measure merely imposes a cost to market access when certain conditions are not met and
would thus be properly analyzed under GATT Article III (national treatment). The structure of
the market access restriction, and the analysis of a justification under Article XX for its GATTviolative aspect(s), is otherwise the same.
201. Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Malaysia, Appellate Body Report, ¶ 141, WT/DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 22, 2001)
(quoting the Panel’s interpretation of the AB’s conclusions in the original Shrimp/Turtle
dispute, which noted that “the Appellate Body ... accepted—at least implicitly—that a
requirement that the U.S. and foreign programmes be ‘comparable in effectiveness’ would be
compatible with the obligations of the United States under the chapeau of Article XX,” and
concluded that “if, in practice, the implementing measure provides for ‘comparable
effectiveness,’ the finding of the Appellate Body in terms of lack of flexibility will have been
addressed”) (emphasis original); id. ¶ 144 (“We ... agree with the conclusion of the Panel on
‘comparable effectiveness.’”).
202. The challenging States were India, Pakistan, Thailand, and Malaysia. See
Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 1.
203. Pub.L.No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988, 1037-38 (1989), codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1537.
204. See Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 138.
205. See Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
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programs which were substantively the same as that of the U.S.206
Unsurprisingly, the U.S. believed that its particular regulatory scheme
(mandating all shrimpers to use turtle-excluding devices) was the most
appropriate regulatory response.207
As mentioned, the Panel established to hear the dispute concluded Section
609 to be a violation of Article XI of the GATT, the prohibition on quantitative
import restrictions,208 a finding which the U.S. did not appeal.209 The Panel
also concluded that the measure did not qualify for exemption under GATT
Article XX.210 On appeal of this legal issue, the AB reversed the Panel in
finding that, on its face, the measure did qualify for provisional exemption
under GATT Article XX(g)—relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources. However, the AB concluded that the measure nevertheless failed to
satisfy the conditions necessary to avail itself of a GATT Article XX
exemption, because the manner in which it was actually applied was
inconsistent with that Article’s chapeau.211
Although the U.S. measure at issue in Shrimp/Turtle was ostensibly
designed so as to exclude from its scope of application cases which do not
threaten the effectiveness of the U.S. domestic conservation program, including
through comparability certifications—entitling it to provisional justification
under the GATT general exceptions regime—the manner in which the
comparability determinations were actually undertaken by the U.S. were held to
constitute ‘unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail.’212 Specifically, it was found that the competent U.S.
government officials, in determining whether particular batches of incoming
shrimp were not harvested so as to pose a threat to sea turtles, and therefore
should be granted U.S. market access, did not actually undertake a contextspecific investigation. Instead, the U.S. authorities were found to have
undertaken a formalistic examination into whether the shrimps’ country of
Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg.
17342 (Apr. 19, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Guidelines].
206. See Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 161.
207. The U.S. required the use of turtle-excluding devices in all shrimp trawl nets under its
jurisdiction following a 1990 U.S. National Academy of Sciences report on sea turtles finding
that any lesser regulation is insufficient to ensure adequate sea turtle conservation.
Shrimp/Turtle, First U.S. Submission, ¶ 39.
208. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 7. See also GATT, supra note 83, art.
XI.
209. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 98.
210. Id. ¶ 7.
211. Id. ¶ 176.
212. Id.
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origin had mandated and enforced a regulatory program that is essentially the
same as that required of domestic shrimpers within the U.S. The AB found this
to have been unacceptable:
[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO Member
to use an economic embargo to require other Members to adopt essentially
the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain policy
goal, as that in force within that Member’s territory, without taking into
consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of
those other Members.213

Further, the fact that individual importers were not given the opportunity
to show that their particular shrimp were not harvested in a way harmful to sea
turtles—that is, that market access was granted or denied on a country-wide
basis—was similarly unacceptable:
[The fact that] shrimp caught using methods identical to those employed in
the United States have been excluded from the United States market solely
because they have been caught in waters of countries that have not been
certified by the United States [...] is difficult to reconcile with the declared
policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles.214

These aspects of the way in which the provisionally-justified measure had
been applied were both seen to contribute to the AB’s conclusion that the
measure failed to qualify for GATT Article XX justification for having been
applied in a manner that constituted unjustifiable215 as well as arbitrary216
discrimination, contrary to Article XX’s chapeau. The AB’s analysis
essentially states that if a Member is going to violate its legal obligations under
213. Id. ¶ 164 (emphasis original).
214. Id. ¶ 165 (emphasis original). It is important to note that the AB found the
requirement of country-wide regulations as a condition for market access to be impermissible
without a provision allowing for individual exemption, despite the arguable environmental
necessity of requiring countries as a whole to enforce turtle-protective measures: because turtles
migrate, the use of turtle excluding devices (“TEDs”) as a conservation measure must be
comprehensive to be effective. As was argued in the litigation that followed the implementation
of the new U.S. guidelines, which gave market access to Brazilian and Australian shrimpers
despite their countries’ lack of a comprehensively-enforced TED system, “the use of TEDs in
[Brazil’s northern fishery] only saves these migratory turtles so that they can die in Brazil’s
southern fishery, where no TEDs are used,” and guidelines allowing for the importation of
shrimp on a shipment-by-shipment basis negates any incentive that countries like Brazil had
been given under section 609 to establish and enforce TED requirements for all shrimping
vessels within their jurisdictions, to ensure that migrating sea turtles don’t end up dead in
shrimp nets within their waters. See Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Mallett, 110 F. Supp.
2d 1005, 1015 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2000).
215. Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 176.
216. Id. ¶ 177.
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the GATT with a measure that is provisionally justified by being carefully
tailored to affect only those products whose regulation is necessary to safeguard
the integrity of domestic environmental programs, then that Member bears the
burden of actually applying that measure so as to in fact only target those
products. Consider the implications of this analysis in the context of the BCA
designs discussed in this Section.
First, none of these drafts offer individual importers a fair opportunity to
show that, although the country in which the products were produced has failed
the U.S. comparability determination, the actual costs to the climate from the
production of the particular products seeking market entry is less than the
average cost to the climate from similar production in that country of origin.
Rather, the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer and Boucher-Dingell drafts (WaxmanMarkey provides no guidance about how adjustment value is to be determined,
other than that it is to be promulgated by the EPA) both provide for the
adjustment value for climate costs assessed at the border to be a function of
statistical averages regarding the country of origin.217 Of course, the scheme
may be easily amended to provide for individualized assessments in cases
where all relevant information is made available by the importer and is
reasonably reliable (as in the BCA proposal argued for in Section IV above).
Nevertheless, the concern is precisely the availability and reliability of
individualized GHG emissions information for foreign producers.
Because self-reported emissions data from a country that does not mandate
independently verified emissions monitoring (or does not effectively enforce
such requirements, or where claims of compliance are otherwise unreliable)
may be difficult to verify, an effective BCA scheme must provide in that event
for a standardized methodology for arriving at an appropriate approximation of
the tCO2e actually embodied in (for having been caused to be emitted in the
course of producing) the products seeking market entry. One major difference
between the BCA design argued for in Section IV above and the design
proposals discussed in the U.S. Congress is the standard that is used for this
purpose. Recall my argument in Section IV for the use of a best available
technology standard—that evaluating the amount of tCO2e embodied in a given
production unit on the presumption that the most emissions-minimizing
technology presently in use by some minimum percentage of the market was
used (when reliable information at to exact emissions cannot be made available
by the importer) would preempt challenge to the BCA under GATT Article III,
accelerate reorientation toward a low-GHG domestic economy, and encourage

217.

See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
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more efficient and hence more competitive domestic production in the long
term.
In the BCA proposals under consideration in this Section, on the other
hand, the requisite adjustment value for such imports is calculated on the basis
of sectoral emissions and total production volume statistics in the country of
origin as a whole, adjusted to take into account the country’s relevant
regulatory responses and economic development.218 The latter proviso may
also apply to initial country comparability determinations,219 and is an
important attempt to bring sensitivity to the different contexts of different
countries of origin into the scheme design. Nevertheless, under the AB’s
analysis in Shrimp/Turtle, because this BCA architecture is likely to present a
prima facie violation of GATT Article III under US—Gasoline,220 and because
the rationale for justifying this violation is, like the rationale behind Section
609 in Shrimp/Turtle, to protect the integrity of domestic environmental
regulations (i.e. to protect against emissions leakage), the scheme must be
applied in such a way that only those products that actually pose such a threat
are affected. It would seem at least plausible that, in the complexity of such an
undertaking, some WTO Members may find themselves to hold legitimate
claims that the BCA’s scope of application is not so carefully tailored as to
apply only to those States, and only to those individual imports, which may
actually contribute to the threat of emissions leakage from the U.S.
It is true that the WTO Dispute Settlement Body eventually satisfied itself
that the U.S. had brought its application of Section 609 into conformity with its
GATT obligations, in the context of which the AB generally concluded that
“conditioning market access on the adoption of a programme comparable in
effectiveness allows for sufficient flexibility in the application of the measure so
as to avoid ‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.’”221 In fact, however, the
218. See supra notes 157–163 and accompanying text.
219. It is explicitly mentioned in this regard by the Lieberman-Warner-Boxer bill, at §
6001(2). It is left out of the Boucher-Dingell draft, and no guidance with respect to how the
comparability determination is to be made (other than that it is the President who is to make it)
is given by the Waxman-Markey bill.
220. See supra notes 158–170.
221. Shrimp/Turtle–Article 21.5, AB Report, supra note 201, ¶ 144 (emphasis added).
Actions taken by the U.S. to bring Section 609 into conformity with its WTO obligations, as
requested by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, were subsequently examined by the Panel
and AB in response to a challenge brought by Malaysia under DSU Article 21.5. Neither party
challenged the Panel’s findings that, given the AB’s report in the original Shrimp/Turtle action,
the statutory language of Section 609, which remained unchanged, still constituted a violation of
GATT Article XI, but also still qualified for provisional justification under GATT Article
XX(g). The substantive dispute between the parties was whether the way in which the U.S. now
applied Section 609 satisfied the requirements of Article XX’s chapeau. Id.¶ 80.
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language of “comparable in effectiveness” appeared identically in the U.S.
implementation guidelines originally challenged in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute,
just as in the revised guidelines in accordance with which application of
Section 609 was eventually found to be consistent with GATT Article XX’s
chapeau.222 Hence, although the U.S. BCA proposals appear to have been
written with the AB’s report in Shrimp/Turtle in mind,223 the mere inclusion of
‘comparability in effectiveness’ provisions will not per se guarantee
consistency with Article XX’s chapeau—trade-restrictive measures based on
regulatory comparability determinations will be eligible for exemption under
GATT Article XX only if “in practice, the implementing measure provides for
‘comparable effectiveness.’”224
In evaluating the U.S.’s actions subsequent to its initial report, the AB did
not actually have opportunity to address and evaluate the way in which the U.S.
was, in practice, conducting comparability evaluations on the basis of
“comparab[ility] in effectiveness.”225 As may be seen from the AB’s report in
the challenge brought against U.S. implementation effort—and in particular
from the U.S.’s implementation status reports, which served as the basis for its
evaluation—rather than broadly implementing a regime based on unilateral
“comparab[ility] in effectiveness” determinations, the U.S. had focused its
efforts primarily on negotiating with the Member States who had initially
complained in Shrimp/Turtle.226 The U.S. status reports primarily emphasized
222. Compare Revised Notice of Guidelines for Determining Comparability of Foreign
Programs for the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 61 Fed. Reg.
17,342, 17,342 (Apr. 19, 1996), with Revised Guidelines for the Implementation of Section 609
of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing
Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,950 (July 8, 1999) [hereinafter 1998 Revised Guidelines].
223. Compare Boucher-Dingell, supra notes 83 and 199, at 217–18 (discussing
“comparable action”), with Shrimp/Turtle–Article 21.5, AB Report, supra note 201, ¶ 144
(discussing “comparable in effectiveness”).
224. Shrimp/Turtle–Article 21.5, AB Report, supra note 201, ¶ 141.
225. Id.
226. The U.S. submitted five implementation status reports between July 1999, when its
revised implementation guidelines went into effect, and January 2000, chronicling the first six
months of Section 609’s functional equivalence regime’s operation under the new
implementation guidelines, U.S. Department of State, Revised Guidelines for the
Implementation of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles
in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 Fed. Reg. 36,946, 36,949–52 (July 8, 1999);
Shrimp/Turtle, Status Report by the United States, T/DS58/15, add. 1–4. The reports also
inform the WTO DSB that, within this six month period, a fishery in Southern Australia was
deemed to warrant the status of comparable effectiveness; a team from Thailand was invited to
the U.S. for a training session in the use of TEDs; and a U.S. team was dispatched to Pakistan to
evaluate that government’s sea turtle conservation program for comparable effectiveness. Id.
However, the primary emphasis of the reports is clearly the ongoing U.S. efforts to negotiate a
regional agreement on turtle mortality in the course of commercial shrimping effort in the Indian
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the U.S.’s participation in the negotiation of a regional agreement with “several
governments in the Indian Ocean Region,”227 and the AB emphasized that the
U.S.’s revised implementation of Section 609 “is justified under Article XX of
the GATT 1994 as long as . . . the ongoing serious good faith efforts to reach
[this] multilateral agreement[] remain satisfied.”228
These ongoing
negotiations were the primary focus of U.S. effort to implement the DSB’s
recommendation in the Shrimp/Turtle dispute,229 and were primarily
responsible for satisfying the DSB that the U.S. had brought its acts into
conformity with the original Shrimp/Turtle report.
Accordingly, the difficulties originally encountered by the U.S. in
applying the functional equivalence recognition component of its scheme were
not necessarily overcome in order to implement the AB’s original
Shrimp/Turtle report. Rather, the U.S. achieved conformity with its WTO
obligations, as requested by the DSB after the Shrimp/Turtle case, by
extensively negotiating with the complaining parties in that case, not by making
its unilateral equivalence recognition procedures more flexible and fair. The
fact that the language with respect to “comparability in effectiveness”
determinations was identical in both the original and the revised guidelines
serves to further support the conclusion that the ultimate resolution of the
Shrimp/Turtle dispute neither consisted of the addition of these words to the
guidelines, nor necessarily serves to protect measures conditioning market
access on “comparability in effect” determinations.
The Shrimp/Turtle dispute is not the only example where ‘comparability
in effect’ determinations have proven difficult. Similar issues arise in the
context of existing mutual recognition (“MR”) regimes,230 and indeed a border
adjustment regime centralized around determinations of foreign regulatory
functional equivalence,231 such as the proposed U.S. BCA discussed above, can
Ocean.
227. See Shrimp/Turtle, Status Report by the United States, WT/DS58/15, Jul. 15, 1999, at
2. See also id., adds. 1, 3, 4.
228. Shrimp/Turtle–Article 21.5, AB Report, supra note 201, ¶ 153(b).
229. See United States Government, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
South-East Asian Marine Turtle Memorandum of Understanding (IOSEA), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/species/turtles/iosea.htm#background.
230. See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLE OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
PROCESS (Fiorella Kostoris Padua Schioppa ed., 2005).
231. See Joseph H. H. Weiler, Mutual Recognition, Functional Equivalence and
Harmonization in the Evolution of the European Common Market and the WTO, in MUTUAL
RECOGNITION 25, supra note 230. See also Kalypso Nicolaidis, Globalization with Human
Faces: Managed Mutual Recognition and the Free Movement of Professionals, in MUTUAL
RECOGNITION 129, 133, supra note 230 (“Formally, mutual recognition can be defined as a
contractual norm between governments—or bodies with delegated authority—mandating the
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be characterized as essentially requiring a “managed unilateral mutual
recognition regime,”232 where a host state compares the qualifications of foreign
GHG regulatory programs to its own, “and where the competent authorities are
to assess some level of equivalence according to unilaterally determined
criteria.”233
Further, the AB’s reasoning in Shrimp/Turtle implies that in order for the
proposed U.S. BCA to qualify for exemption under GATT Article XX, it
would require a comparability regime operating on principles much like those
underlying the conception of MR regimes. If an imported product, such as a
particular batch of shrimp or a particular batch of steel, in fact meets the (turtleor GHG-) conservation objectives of the importing state regulatory regime, then
a border scheme seeking justification under XX(g) which does not allow
sufficient flexibility to exempt such products from its scope is by definition
unnecessarily restrictive.234

Importantly, however, the MR doctrine, originally a doctrine of
European integration,235 has itself encountered a number of relevant
application difficulties, notwithstanding many contextual aspects
favorable to its development that are furthermore unique to the

transfer of regulatory authority from the host country (or jurisdiction) where a transaction takes
place, to the home country (or jurisdiction) from which a product, a person, a service or a firm
originate (jurisdictions are generally sovereign states but they can also be sub-national units in
federal entities).”).
232. See Nicolaidis, Managed Mutual Recognition, supra note 231, at 132 (describing
unilateral recognition in the context of professional services, and explaining that “[t]his involves
comparing the qualifications acquired by a professional in a home state with those required in a
host state where the professional requests recognition, and where the competent authorities are
to assess some level of equivalence according to unilaterally determined criteria”). By analogy,
in the U.S. BCA (under both proposals), a U.S. agency would “compar[e] the qualifications [of
a GHG allowance/credit] acquired . . . in a home state with those required [of such
allowances/credits] in a host state where [the foreign allowances/credits] request[] recognition,
and where the competent authorities are to assess some level of equivalence according to
unilaterally determined criteria.”
233. Id.
234. As Professor Weiler explains, “[the principle of mutual recognition or functional
equivalence] is but a banal doctrinal manifestation of the principle of necessity which is also a
pillar of GATT jurisprudence. If an imported product meets the safety or other objectives of the
importing state regulatory regime but does so by adopting a different set of technical standards
which are not authorized by the importing state regulation—how could they ever claim that it is
necessary to exclude that import from the national market? And if they cannot so claim, how
could they justify the exclusion under the Justification regime of Article XX GATT?” Weiler,
Mutual Recognition, supra note 231, at 59 (emphasis original).
235. See, e.g., Nicolaidis, Managed Mutual Recognition, supra note 231, at 135 (noting the
“formal invention of mutual recognition” with the Treaty of Rome).
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European experience,236 and so not easily generalizable to overall global
trade relations.237 Jacques Pekmans notes, for example, that “the
reliance on MR in the EU is greatly facilitated by the forceful treaty
principle of free movement, a principle that does not exist and cannot
be expected in international trade law or in economic regionalism
elsewhere,” and that this principle of free movement, combined with the
fact that “a supranational ECJ is neither present in the WTO regime nor
in other regional trade regimes . . . makes it doubtful whether MR, with
all its profound consequences, can be exported to world trade or other
trade blocks.”238
It is therefore instructive that even within the EU, mutual
recognition regimes have proven to involve significant cost and
administrative complexity.239 Indeed, a “deep scepticism amongst
economic agents in markets about MR”240 continues to persist. Further,
the complexity of implementing MR regimes truly based on functional
equivalence has itself necessitated a gradual and hierarchically top-down
negotiating process to facilitate their establishment.241 Indeed
236. See Alfonso Mattera, The Principle of Mutual Recognition and Respect for National,
Regional and Local Identities and Traditions, in MUTUAL RECOGNITION 1, 11, supra note 230
(noting that the Member States of the European Union, “in spite of their different traditions and
legislations, have common cultural and scientific roots and belong to the same Community,
which is held together by links stemming from a common-body legislation, common institutions
and a supranational jurisdiction within which rulings apply to all states”).
237. See also Trebilcock & Howse, Regulatory Diversity, supra note 68, at 9–10 (“[D]eep
economic integration amongst nation states is typically predicated either on the existence of a
hegemonic power with the ability to impress its will on other smaller and weaker states (the U.S.
in the immediate post-War years), or willingness amongst member-states to cede substantial
aspects of their domestic political sovereignty to supranational political institutions—a
willingness that for the most part is likely to be conditional on a reasonably egalitarian
distribution of political influence and a common interest in overarching political objectives (in
the case of Europe, the mitigation of conflicts that had devastated the continent militarily and
economically over the first half of this century). Neither of these conditions is likely to apply in
the foreseeable future elsewhere either with respect to other regional trading blocs or with
respect to the multilateral system at large.”) (citing MICHAEL TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE,
THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 502–503 (Routledge 1995)).
238. Jacques Pelkmans, Mutual Recognition in Goods and Services: An Economic
Perspective, in MUTUAL RECOGNITION 85, 88, supra note 230 (citation omitted).
239. See id. at 103 (“Mutual recognition turns out to have fairly high information,
transaction and compliance costs.”).
240. Id. at 105. See also Nicolaidis, Managed Mutual Recognition, supra note 231, at 140
(noting that professional bodies in the EU would “prefer[] to set criteria for equivalence on their
own to be translated into sectoral [EU] Directives rather than leaving such assessment to the
‘arbitrary’ decisions of ‘state bureaucrats’”).
241. See Nicolaidis, Managed Mutual Recognition, supra note 231, at 174 (“[G]enerally,
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Pelkmans’s explicit “aim is to have the reader understand that MR can
only flourish in a well-defined and hierarchical legal regime,”242 a highly
prohibitive requirement in most international relations, but particularly
in the context of a bottom-up strategy for developing comprehensive
global GHG management.
Importantly, no comparability in effect determinations of the sort
envisioned by the legislative proposals considered here have ever been
successfully implemented in the context of regulatory GHG emissions
programs, despite increasing and widespread arguments for the desirability of
linking GHG emissions allowance trading markets from different regulatory
jurisdictions.243 Consider for instance the fact that the E.U.’s Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS)—the most sophisticated example of a regional GHG
emissions regulatory scheme—does not grant the national administrative
agencies responsible for its implementation authority to engage in the type of
direct comparability determinations that are envisioned in the U.S. proposals:
While the E.U. ETS allows for linkage with the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM),244 the Linking Directive directs relevant
national agencies not to evaluate incoming credits for comparability, but rather
simply to accept “[a]ll CERs [Certified Emissions Reductions] and ERUs
[Emissions Reduction Units] that are issued and may be used in accordance
with the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol and the subsequent decisions
adopted thereunder.”245 Although the original E.U. ETS Directive encouraged
the Member States to conclude agreements with parties in Kyoto Protocol’s
Annex B for the mutual recognition of GHG emission allowances,246 and
although such agreements were further encouraged by the Linking Directive
MRAs [mutual recognition agreements] will likely follow from two prior steps: (a) adoption of
framework agreements calling for MRAs; and (b) the crafting of detailed work programmes,
roadmaps and guidelines for designing MRAs which can provide a precious basis for learning
from precedents.”). See also Pelkmans, Mutual Recognition, supra note 238, at 106 (noting the
crucial role played by the EU’s 98/34 Committee in the EU MR regime).
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., JUDSON JAFFE AND ROBERT N. STAVINS, INTERNATIONAL EMISSIONS TRADING
ASSOCIATION, LINKING TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEMS FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS:
OPPORTUNITIES, IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES (2007).
244. See EU Parliament & Council, Directive 2004/101/EC, Amending Directive
2003/87/EC Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within
the Community, in Respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s Project Mechanisms, Oct. 27, 2004.
245. Id. ¶ 2. However, the directive explicitly excepts credits generated by nuclear
facilities or from land use, land use change, or forestry activities. Id.
246. EU Parliament & Council, Directive 2003/87/EC, Establishing a Scheme for
Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading within the Community and amending Council
Directive 96/61/EC, 13 Oct. 2003, at Art. 25.
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with States that have mandatory cap-and-trade policies but may not be Kyoto
parties,247 no such procedures have actually been established. Even in the
experimental private sector, although the Chicago Climate Exchange
technically has procedures in place for accepting CDM-issued units into its
regulatory system, these procedures have never actually been used.248
Although, as mentioned above, at least three of the four most prevalent
U.S. BCA proposals appear to have been written with the AB’s report in
Shrimp/Turtle in mind,249 operationalizing its “comparable in effectiveness”
provisions is likely to prove difficult. As shown by the Shrimp/Turtle dispute
itself, it is much easier to conclude that a foreign regulatory scheme which is
substantively identical to that of an importing State satisfies the equivalence
condition, than it is to reach that conclusion about a substantively different
regulatory scheme that is nevertheless ‘comparable in effectiveness.’250
Consider, for example, the fact that Section 609 was based on a report from the
National Academy of Sciences, which had recommended the regulatory
response employed by the U.S. government, presenting this regulatory response
as the most effective of the turtle-conservation alternatives.251 It is
unsurprising, therefore, that U.S. competent authorities had found it difficult to
assess as ‘comparable’ any foreign regulatory schemes but those that were
substantively very similar to those employed by the U.S., resulting in the
withholding of affirmative comparability assessments from any foreign
regulatory scheme which was not essentially substantively identical to its own
regulatory scheme—a violation of Article XX’s chapeau.252
The proposals for a U.S. BCA currently included in the LiebermanWarner-Boxer, Boucher-Dingell, and Waxman-Markey drafts all envision a
border measure which, like Section 609, conditions market access on the basis
of a product’s country of origin satisfying a ‘comparability in effect’
determination with respect to its internal GHG regulatory regime. Given the
inherent difficulties in determining a truly substantively different regulatory
247. EU Linking Directive, supra note 244, at preambular (18).
248. See Erik Haites, Margaree Consultants Inc., Toronto, Linking Trading Agreements,
Designing Climate Change Policy, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, May 21,
2008, available at http://www.usc.edu/research/private/docs/initiatives/future_fuels/Haites.pdf,
at 8.
249. Compare Boucher-Dingell, supra notes 83 and 199, at 217–18 (discussing
“comparable action”), with Shrimp/Turtle–Article 21.5, AB Report, supra note 201, ¶ 144
(discussing “comparable in effectiveness”).
250. See Pelkmans, Mutual Recognition, supra note 238, at 124 (noting “the lack of clarity
about the [comparable] ‘effects’” aspect of mutual recognition regimes).
251. See supra note 207.
252. See Shrimp/Turtle, AB Report, supra note 173, ¶ 164–65.
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program to be ‘comparably effective,’ taking into account the contextual
differences among all the WTO Member States, it is not implausible that some
Members may hold legitimate claims that the BCA’s discrimination on the
basis of country of origin—a prima facie violation of GATT Articles I and III—
is unjustifiable under Article XX’s chapeau.
Given the specific facts resolving the Shrimp/Turtle dispute—in particular
the negotiation of a regional agreement with the complaining parties—reliance
on ‘comparability in effect’ on the basis of that case is unwarranted and
dangerous. In the global GHG management context, many more Member
States would potentially be affected than the four challengers in Shrimp/Turtle.
Given that BCA schemes are necessary precisely because no overarching
global regime exists that would impose comparably effective GHG abatement
effort obligations on all GHG-emitting States,253 a similar strategy to that used
in Shrimp/Turtle—that is, negotiating the details of an appropriate climate
change regulatory response with all affected parties—is presumed to have been
unsuccessful, as otherwise the need for (though perhaps not the desirability
of254) BCA would have been obviated. Accordingly, it is likely that current
formulations for a draft U.S. BCA will place the U.S. legislation in unnecessary
tension with U.S. legal obligations under the GATT, violating the mostfavored-nation principle of GATT Article I and national treatment principle of
GATT Article III and, in relying on ‘comparability in effect’ determinations,
choosing an unnecessarily difficult route to justification under Article XX.255
VI. Conclusion
The world appears on a steady course toward an eventually comprehensive
network of GHG management, and any such future climate regime will
undoubtedly have numerous impacts on international trade. As the one
253. See supra Section II.
254. See supra Section III for arguments supporting the desirability of BCA regardless of
the success of international agreements.
255. Because I argue that the proposed U.S. BCA, as it is currently envisioned in the drafts
under consideration here, is set up so as to be vulnerable under the unjustifiable discrimination
prong of GATT Article XX’s chapeau, I do not get into the other two prongs of analysis under
the chapeau. Importantly, however, to avoid a conflict with Article XX’s chapeau under the
‘disguised restriction’ prong, it is imperative also that the BCA be designed and structured as a
focused response to a serious threat to the integrity of national GHG abatement effort through
highly probable emissions leakage. See de Cendra, Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 106, at
145 (“... to avoid the BTA from being considered a ‘disguised restriction’, it is necessary that its
design, architecture and structure show clearly that it is not introduced to achieve traderestrictive objectives.”) (citing EC-Asbestos, Panel, supra note 108, at ¶ 8.236).
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hundred and ninety-two States party to the UNFCCC continue to work toward
consensus regarding an international agreement on global GHG management to
succeed the Kyoto Protocol, the possibility remains clear that consensus among
the major emitters and economic powers may not be reached or, more likely
still, that the price of ex ante top-down consensus may be a failure to commit to
the level of stringency in global GHG-regulation that, given IPCC projections
and recommendations, may be required to achieve the objective of UNFCCC
Article 2. It is therefore advisable for the UNFCCC parties to devise an
architecture for climate response that will facilitate rather than obstruct
interactions of mutual support between the international climate and
international trade regimes.
In this paper, I have argued that the use of BCA measures, in conjunction
with national cap-and-trade schemes which allocate capped tradable allowances
by government auction, may not only be justified as a matter of world trade
law, but may also offer unique benefits for the development of economically
efficient and environmentally effective global GHG management. Although
the most recent important legislative proposals in the U.S. Congress regarding a
national GHG regulatory scheme all include provisions which fall within the
definition of what I have here termed BCA, I have argued that they place the
U.S. legislation in unnecessary tension with U.S. legal obligations under the
GATT, and that an alternative—origin-neutral—design structure should instead
be employed.
Rather than the comparability-centered BCA favored by current U.S.
legislative proposals, a BCA designed on the basis of an understanding that the
levying of climate costs associated with GHGs emitted in the course of
production should be regulated at the point of consumption, in accordance with
the destination principle, would both engender greater beneficial regulatory
competition and place less strain upon a WTO Member’s legal obligations than
current U.S. BCA proposals.256 Conditioning market access for certain
domestic and imported GHG-intensive goods on the purchase of GHG
allowances for every GHG-ton emitted in the course of production may provide
an important mechanism to facilitate a response to the global threat of rising
GHG emission levels, encouraging the gradual establishment of a transborder
administrative regime for coordinating the appropriate levels of cost

256. Recall again the criticism of recent trends toward the omission of BCA altogether in
favor of rebates to sectors affected by international competition—such an approach undermines
the entire purpose of climate-cost internalizing national GHG schemes and is, in any case,
unnecessary given that, as argued above, BCA can be designed in such a way as to withstand
challenges of protectionism.
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distribution necessary to eventually steer the globe toward both a wellfunctioning climate and a well-functioning economy.
In sum, I have argued that the difficulties at the heart of current proposals
for a U.S. BCA place an unnecessary strain on international trade relations and
unnecessarily conflict with U.S. obligations as a Member State in the WTO,
that a more elegant option exists under WTO law, and that this alternative
conception of BCA objectives and design will also be more likely to lead to
both greater international cooperation in GHG management and greater
objective GHG abatement effort, by creating better conditions of possibility for
fruitful regulatory competition.

